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Reductionism in psychology is traditionally regarded as an exercise in drawing data 
from a physiological field in order to explain psychological or behavioural 
phenomena. The data taken from the physiological level are seen in this view as more 
basic and more real in terms of a hierarchy of sciences, and come closer to providing 
"hard facts" due to physiology lying lower on a hierarchy of sciences than psychology. 
However, reductionism is also considered here in a number of different ways, including: 
1) the breaking down of wholes into parts in science; 2) reduction to disciplines such as 
mechanics or computing through modelling; 3) reduction "upwards" to higher levels 
than psychology; 4) single concepts in psychology; and 5) individualism as a reductive 
outlook. 
The hierarchy of sciences is critiqued in terms of indeterminacies that prevent the 
lower-level sciences from fully constituting the higher-level sciences. A "downwardly 
determinative" outlook is endorsed which sees the contents of lower-level sciences as 
being distributed or guided by the systems that the higher-level sciences represent. 
Non-specific precipitants at higher levels are seen to control the more widely 
distributed but more specialised phenomena at lower levels, and a twin-aspect 
theoretical outlook is endorsed which sees a given unit of analysis as being a whole in 
itself and part of a larger system. 
The implication of this for reductionism in psychology is that whilst an elimination of 
psychological terms in favour of physiological terms is rejected, explanations that 
include physiology in a complementary role may have some value, although such 
contributions may appear insignificant in the light of the higher-level concepts that 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
Reductionism in science is an issue that un-
derlies the whole concept of a hierarchi-
cally ordered world. The problem of 
whether one level of knowledge can be re-
duced to another level has implications for 
a diversity of questions such as what consti-
tutes a sufficient explanation, can the sci-
ences be autonomous from each other, to 
what extent are the phenomena of the world 
mechanically determined, and the question 
of how the empirical world gains its credi-
bility. 
Reductionism is now no longer regarded as 
a complete belief-system in itself that en-
ables sufficient description or explanation of 
the workings of the world (Wimsatt, 1979), 
and the reductive faith that holds that any 
irreducibility between levels of systems or 
theories is due to deficits in the technologi-
cal sophistication of the current research era 
has diminished somewhat, replaced by a 
scepticism which places the onus upon the 
reductive philosophy and method to prove 
itself. Reductionism in science can be seen as 
a question that is central to the philosophy 
of science (Vollmer,1984), and questions re-
garding the adequacy, nature and place of 
reductive theorising in psychology are a 
major concern of this thesis. 
Reductionism in psychology appears to be 
a legacy of the positivistic mode of science 
that psychology borrowed from the natural 
sciences such as physics and chemistry. As a 
general rule, wholes are broken down into 
parts and the parts are studied. A more 
common conception of reductionism in psy-
chology is of the translation problem be-
tween sciences or levels of analysis, usually 
psychology and physiology (biology). 
However, reduction occurs in the scientific 
process in a number of different ways, and 
the first part of this chapter will present a 
list of several different processes that the 
terms "reduction" or "reductionism" can refer 
to. Although it has a wide scope, the list 
should not be considered exhaustive. 
This dissertation is a result of seeing the 
scientific process in two ways: 1) As a lin-
guistic process; and 2) as an observer and 
manipulator of stuff, .i.e. real things, albeit 
through theory. A perspective that sees re-
ductive science as a result of academic 
publication pressures is also interesting but 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Here then is 
a list of six different types of reductive 
strategy in psychology: 
1) Reduction from psychology to physiology 
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(including neurophysiology). 
2) Reduction to other disciplines such as 
economics and computing through modelling. 
Single concepts on psychology. 
3) Reduction of societal level phenomena to 
the level of the individual (individualism). 
5) Reduction "upwards" from psychology to 
higher order phenomena. 
6) The breaking down of wholes into parts. 
The literature on reductionism that this 
thesis attempts to represent covers the field 
of reduction or reductionism (these two terms 
will be used interchangeably) in a number of 
different ways, some of which are indicated 
in the six types of reductive strategy 
outlined above. A soft-focus indication of the 
main message that comes across in this thesis 
is that reductionism is an issue that goes 
beyond the linguistic problems of translating 
one scientific language or terminology into 
another; the reductive programme en-
courages a way of dealing with concrete 
worldly phenomena that sees scientists 
breaking down wholes into constituent parts 
and studying the parts regardless of whether 
or not the terms translate or the higher-
level meaning remains intact. Explanation 
consists of reducing a subject of science to its 
constituent parts, which are considered to 
contain the essence of understanding the 
target phenomenon. Thus in spite of the pre-
supposition of hierarchical order, the con-
stituent parts are studied. The gross proper-
ties of higher-level entities are then de-
duced or extrapolated from the more funda-
mental entities and processes (Robinson, 
1986). The term "unit of analysis" is used in 
this thesis to refer to the nature of the con-
tent of a given science or discipline - the size 
or scope of this unit is an important factor 
and indicates the level of science the unit 
lies at. 
Such a wide-ranging literature provides 
difficulties in the integration of the work of 
different people saying the same things in 
different ways.The topic of reductionism is 
relevant to discussions on the mind-body 
problem, consciousness, linguistic work on 
translation problems between different sci-
entific and natural languages, wholes, sums 
and parts, individualism and the problem of 
the organism in psychology. Thus some at-
tempt is made here to cover a wide range of 
material. There is also the conflict in this 
thesis between precise, repetitive, parsimo-
nious language and the more interesting but 
less precise practise of saying something in a 
new way every time. Given the theoretical 
nature of the dissertation and the resulting 
implications for freedom of expression, some 
license is taken when jargon terms threaten 
to bore the reader. For example, the second 
word of the phrase "reductive strategy" 
could be replaced by any of the following 
words: analysis, philosophy, outlook, 
programme, methodology, method, para-
digm, epistemology, ontology, science or 
persuasion. 
The scientific community that uses 
reductionism as its method and philosophy 
of action is the subject of study in this thesis, 
but this is not a dissertation on scientific 
method itself. A major concern here is on the 
knowledge framework that reductionism 
operates in - this thesis talks about things 
that happen even before the empirical work 
starts. The reductive way of interpreting the 
world influences the results of data collec-
tion before the data are taken. The objective 
is not, therefore, to suggest improvements on 
scientific method, but to develop a plausible 
or more realistic theoretical framework 
that better represents an assumed complex-
ity between levels of systems in science. 
Summary of Chapters 
Chapter Two examines the atomistic 
method that follows from the reductive 
framework of positivistic science. The em-
phasis is on an explication of the neural 
structures that are studied in physiological 
psychology. The structure and function of the 
basic neuron is outlined in some detail in or-
der to present in sharp focus the all-or-none 
firing mechanism that is held in reduction-
ist circles to carry the burden of psychologi-
cal content. The aggregate properties of 
clusters of millions of neurons are discussed, 
along with the emergent properties that 
appear as a result of such aggregation. 
Chapter Three examines the difficult 
topic of explanation in science and psychol-
ogy, and attempts to relate causation with 
description and explanation. Explanation is 
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seen to be carried out through theory, and 
the theory-dependent nature of observations 
is stressed. 
Chapter Four continues the theme of ex-
planation in psychology, with reference to 
the different levels of science from which 
explanatory information can be sought. The 
concept of levels of science is critiqued, and a 
hierarchy of systems is also outlined.The 
unit of analysis for psychology in the light 
of this hierarchy of systems is discussed, 
and a twin-aspect theoretical outlook is 
proposed that sees scientific phenomena as 
being wholes in themselves and also part of 
a larger system, an outlook which attempts 
to avoid certain problems of either a "top-
down" approach or a "bottom-up" approach. 
Chapter Five tackles the issues in trans-
lation between sciences, and discusses three 
different views of reduction in psychology, 
namely "eliminative-reduction", "deriva-
tion-reduction" and "model reduction". 
Whilst the eliminative view is rejected in 
favour of a derivational approach, Chapter 
Five is largely concerned with presenting a 
derivational approach that fits in with the 
framework developed in Chapter Four. 
The Conclusion attempts to synthesise 
the aspects of reduction that were broken 
down into the constituent chapters, with an 
emphasis on a theoretical outlook that sees 
the subject matter of science as being best 
represented by the twin-aspect approach 
outlined in Chapter Four. 

CHAPTER TWO 
Reduction to Physiology 
Introduction. 
Reduction to physiology is the concern of the 
psychological reductionist, since physiology 
is the next lower science on a hierarchy of 
sciences that runs from physics near the 
"bottom" through to sociology near the 
"top". This type of reductionism is one on 
which a whole field of research is based-
physiological psychology. Journals servicing 
this field include the Behavioural & Brain 
sciences, Behavioural Biology, Psy-
chopharmacology, and Psychophysiology. 
Reducing psychological phenomena to the 
biological level often involves changing the 
nature of the explanatory variable from 
some sort of psychological phenomenon to a 
previously unsuspected physiological phe-
nomenon. This does not necessarily mean 
that the problem is seen as "nothing but" 
systems or processes at the lower level, al-
though it is the favoured option. It is taken 
here that the psychological concept that is 
of greatest interest to the physiological 
psychologist is behaviour. Thus reduction in 
psychology involves reducing behaviour to 
physiology. The treatment of bodily func-
tions (such as motor movement) a s 
physiological questions is also studied but is 
more within-level and has more tenuous 
links with psychology. The replacement of 
psychological with physiological explana-
tions is also an option. Two theoretical 
views on reduction, eliminative-reduction 
and derivation-reduction (after Clarke, 
1980) will introduce different ways of inter-
preting what is seen here as the same 
methodological task. Clark has a third 
view, model-reduction, that is discussed in 
Chapter Five. 
The two types of reduction outlined 
above described by Clarke (1980) are: 
1) Eliminative-reduction; This type of 
reduction follows from a replacement as-
sumption that for a theory A to reduce to re-
duce to a theory B, then the sentences of 
theory A must in all cases be successfully 
replaced by the sentences in theory B . The-
ories do not have to be expressed in senten-
tial form. Thus when a successful reduction is 
made, the terms of the more fundamental 
science leave no room for the terms of the 
higher level science. 
2) Derivation-reduction; The reducing 
theory does not replace or render irrelevant 
the reduced theory, it merely provides a 
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second set of explanations for the same phe-
nomena. The reducing theory explains why 
the laws of the reduced theory hold 
(Clarke,1980). Reducing laws in this type of 
reductionism complement the laws at the 
higher level. 
Clark regards theories as sets of sentences 
useful for explaining phenomena. Treating 
theories as a linguistic phenomenon renders 
the problem of reductionism an exercise in 
the logical relations between the theories at 
different levels. If the sentences of different 
levels can be logically derived from the 
sentences of a reducing theory, then a suc-
cessful reduction has taken place. However, 
there are also methodological considera-
tions regarding reductionism that are 
important to mention, namely that a reduc-
tionist theory facilitates a scientific 
method that involves measuring the physi-
ological states of the organisms under study. 
This can be carried out to a point where 
linguistic translation problems between 
sciences can almost, but not quite, be ignored. 
As mentioned before, it is these 
methodological considerations that are of 
chief interest in this chapter. 
What is Reduction to Physiology? 
Reduction to physiology involves, amongst 
other things, identification of neural states 
as mental processes, and as determinants of 
behaviour. This section starts by exploring 
the relationship between mental states and 
neural states. 
Mental states or processes are considered 
here to be the same thing as the "mind", 
with the latter being a rather more vague 
term. Valentine (1982) listed mental phe-
nomena to include sensations, images, 
thoughts, beliefs, intentions and decisions. 
After the Copernican revolution in sci-
ence, causes of worldly phenomena came 
down out of the heavens and into the natural 
world (Koestler,1959). Progress in physics 
and chemistry carried the message that 
worldly phenomena could be explained with 
reference to other worldly phenomena at a 
different, lower level. Newton proposed a 
force that accounted for the tendency of ob-
jects to fall, and even explained why some 
objects fall faster than others. In medicine, a 
circulatory system emerged, eliminating the 
need for a celestial source of a continual sup-
ply of blood. After the discovery that the 
brain had some role to play in behaviour 
and bodily function, it eventually became 
clear that the brain was not an 
undifferentiated unit, and some localisation 
of function was possible regarding bodily 
function. Localisation of function with 
regard to behaviour became increasingly 
evident, with the encapsulation of the mind 
in the brain being a logical progression. Thus 
the scientific answer to the question "what 
are mental states" became one that increas-
ingly, if not exclusively, referred to neural 
states. 
The scientific, reductionist interpretation 
of the neural nature of mental processes in-
volves an implicit endorsement of a particu-
lar view of the mind-body problem. This 
view is known as the monist-materialist 
view (Marx & Hillix, 1979), although other 
orientations can be fitted into a reductionist 
framework. This view encompasses a simple 
philosophy which sees mental events as 
neurophysiological events or processes 
occurring in the brain (The term 
"neurophysiological events" will be con-
densed where possible to "neural states"). 
From this perspective the mind is not a 
mystic or intangible thing, but a physical 
entity localized in the brain area. Other-
wise known as physicalism, this extreme 
materialist interpretation of the mind-body 
problem is quite consistent with a reduction-
ist outlook. However, physicalism, as men-
tioned earlier, is not the only interpretation 
of the mind-body problem that is consistent 
with reductionism. Other views can be rec-
onciled with reductionism (e.g. psy-
chophysiological parallelism), and given 
that bodily neural states exist, one could 
probably reconcile almost any orientation to 
the mind-body problem with reductionism. 
The purpose in mentioning the mind-body 
problem then, is to point out the materialis-
tic, atomistic orientation implicit in much 
scientific work. The next section analyses 
the atomistic method in some detail. 
Neural States: The Basic Neuron. 
The neuron, known as the "basic unit of the 
nervous system" (Levinthal, 1979) is able to 
receive and transmit signals (figure one), 
thus facilitating communication between 
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different parts of the body. A human brain 
contains approximately ten billion neurons. 
The signals that the neurons transmit are 
electrical, although the transmission be-
tween neurons is better understood as elec-
trochemical in nature.The neuron has three 
main components - the soma, the dendrites 
and the axon. An impulse is received by the 
dendrites through the synaptic clefts. It 
travels, in most cases, through the cell body, 
and along the axon as a single process. At 
the furtherest end, the axon branches out out 
to several small end points called terminal 
boutons or buttons. The area of interest here 
as will be seen, lies in the activity at the 
synapses, therefore a short outline of the 
activities in the synaptic clefts is appro-
priate. 
The Synaptic Cleft. 
The structure and process is somewhat com-
plicated and bears some explaining. Briefly, 
the firing axon sends a message to the 
terminal buttons and a number of synaptic 
vesicles (bags of neurotransmitter) move to a 
presynaptic membrane, adhere to it, and 
then rupture, with the contents being re-
leased into the synaptic cleft. The synaptic 
cleft is a minute gap between the presynap-
tic and postsynaptic membranes, across 
which the neurotransmitter travels in order 
to stimulate the postsynaptic receptors that 
send signals to converge on the axon hillock 
(figure two). If the "action potential is 
propogated", then the neuron can "fire". 
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Figure one. Drawing showing the three main 




















to the axon hlllock 
The movements of neurotransmitters are 
closely involved with the electrical va-
lences that surround the presynaptic and 
postsynaptic membranes. For example, neu-
rotransmitter is released by the sudden re-
versal of charges on either side of the mem-
brane. This reversal of charges is due to the. 
exchange of positively and negatively 
charged elements through the membranes. 
The neuron is found throughout the ner-
vous system, and has a remarkably simple 
function. A neuron that is at rest does not 
transmit any information. A neuron that is 
"firing" receives and transmits a single im-
pulse. The concept of the threshold is 
important here. A neuron needs to receive a 
signal of sufficient strength to enable it to 
pass the signal on. A "weak" signal may re-
sult in the failure of the next neuron to fire. 
The signal can break down at any stage. 
For example: 1) The weak signal may re-
sult in insufficient quantities of neurotrans-
mitter being released into the synaptic 
clefts; 2) the receptor membranes may re-
ceive insufficier).t quantities of neurotrans-
mitter and fail to be properly stimulated; 3) 
The dendrites may send an insufficient num-
ber of signals to the axon hillock for the 
neuron to fire. 
These three examples indicate three 
places in the causal chain where the the 
signal can break down. The third example, 
the situation where not enough signals from 
the dendrites arrive at the axon hillock, is 
of some interest here, because it is at this 
point that the neuron either fires or does not 
fire. When the brain is considered in a re-
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ductionist sense as a collection of several 
billion neurons, the salient problem is 
whether or not the neurons are firing. 
Physiological psychologists address them-
selves, amongst other things, to the question 
of why neurons may or may not fire, as a cor-
relate of certain psychological states. Apart 
from a weak signal, other possibilities are 
also of interest to the physiological psy-
chologist. Problems in the neural transmis-
sion chain that hinder the signal getting 
through, or help to produce a signal when 
firing is inappropriate, have been linked 
with psychological problems. For example, 
organic or biogenic depression has been 
linked to lowered levels of Norepinephrine 
(NE) activity in the "sympathetic" regions 
of the brain. A freely functioning sympa-
thetic system presumably works against an 
opposing force within the brain, with the 
result being a neutral behavioural disposi-
tion. The brain tends to work in opposites 
(Carlson,1981), with a "normal" state being 
a neutral (or near neutral, to facilitate 
change) result of opposing forces. NE is sus-
pected to be a transmitter substance in the 
synapses (Levinthal, 1979), so if the levels 
of NE are depleted, there is a lower likeli-
hood that the receptors on the dendrites 
will receive the transmitter. 
Whether by deduction or by accident, it 
was discovered that certain types of drugs 
relieved the symptoms of organic depression 
(Levinthal,1979). Mono-amine oxidase 
(MAO) inhibitors apparently "block" the 
action of MAO. MAO serves to break down 
the biogenic amines norepinephrine, dop-
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amine and serotonin. The application of 
drugs that are thought to block the action of 
MAO results in relief of depressive symp-
toms. Relating depressive systems to the 
relative absence of brain NE, and mania to a 
surfeit of brain NE is the focus of the Shild-
krau t-Kety hypothesis (Levinthal, 1979). 
Tricyclic antidepressants also raise the 
level of brain NE by slowing down the re-
uptake of neurotransmitter into the terminal 
button after transmission, thus allowing 
more NE across the synapse. 
There are many other things that can go 
wrong in the synapse area. Examples are: 1) 
Manufacture of neurotransmitter may be in-
hibited; 2) The release of neurotransmitter 
into the synaptic cleft may be inhibited; 3) 
The re-uptake process may be too fast or in-
hibited; or 4) The receptors in the dendrites 
may be blocked or triggered by an unwanted 
substance. 
Many research problems centre on the 
biochemical activities in and around the 
synapse. However, in spite of the micro-
scopic intricacies of the synaptic chain, the 
neuron still either fires or does not fire, ac-
cording to the intensity of signals received 
at the axon hillock: "... it is clear that at 
any instant in time, neurons "fire" or they 
don't fire - that is all they do. Nonetheless, 
as a result of this deceptively simple activ-
ity, all the functions of the nervous system 
are eventually carried out - from the sim-
plest reflex action to the most complex act 
of creative thought. The idea of how such 
complexity can derive from such utter sim-
plicity is one of the marvels of the nervous 
system "(Levinthal 1979, p13). How could 
such faith in reductive strategy be main-
tained given the relatively crude inves-
tigative methods available? An answer to 
this question could lie in the indeterminacy 
located in the synaptic clefts. As mentioned 
before, psychological problems can generate 
research questions that concern the success or 
failure of synaptic transmission according to 
what happens in the synaptic clefts, with 
the result that a part of the brain labeled 
with a certain function does not work prop-
erly. These research questions centering on 
the synaptic clefts can be considered in two 
ways: 
Firstly, these problems can be construed 
in a negative light in that they frustrate 
the researcher, and are implicated in the 
suffering of the host person/ organism. Sci-
ence is seen from this perspective as being 
"held back" by the limits of knowledge, al-
though the researcher may see such prob-
lems as exciting challenges. 
The second interpretation of synaptic in-
determinacies is one that may throw some 
light on the faith in reductive theory and 
method shown in the Levinthal quotation 
above. These indeterminacies may actually 
allow the researcher to keep a faith in the 
ultimate aim of complete reduction. The 
lack of solid answers leaves the researcher 
with a technique or strategy that is not dis-
confirmed. Given that answers about the 
minute entities are somewhat elusive, the 
scientist is able to envisage perfect or near-
perfect neurophysiological reduction as be-
ing merely a long-term product of advancing 
technology. 
The example of depression portrayed as 
an organic illness is not, of course, represen-
tative of depressive illness as a whole. The 
broad distinction between reactive and or-
ganic depression recognises two of the pos-
sible "sources" of depressive behaviour. In 
addition, higher level processes are hard to 
ignore: "The difficulty with using reactive 
depression as an example of the logic of re-
duction is simply that reactive depression is 
an extremely complicated psychological 
phenomenon. Many of its psychological as-
pects are not understood. Depression in-
volves attitudes, beliefs, desires, values and 
moods, and those phenomena in tum involve 
very sophisticated human linguistic and 
cognitive capacities "(Clark 1980,p37). 
Apart from introducing the argument 
that a multitude of factors are involved 
with depression, this view suggests that 
some psychological problems are more ap-
propriate than others for reductive analy-
sis. Unipolar or exogenous depression may be 
more amenable to within-level analysis, 
giving rise in the clinical literature to 
within-level treatments such as shown in 
Lewinsohn & Hoberman's (1982) summary of 
behavioural and cognitive treatments of 
unipolar depression. The logic of reduction 
as mentioned by Clark is a complicated is-
sue, and such epistemological matters will 
be discussed in Chapter Five. 
The emphasis in this chapter is on the 
reduction from psychological concepts to 
singular neurons. Neurons are not expected 
here to carry the burden of psychological 
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meaning in reductive analysis, in spite of 
the deterministic hope expressed in the 
Levinthal (1979) quotation. Although the 
neuron has been heavily implicated in the 
psychological field, the attribution of a 
concept such as purposiveness to a single 
neuron in an identity relationship will be 
critically discussed in Chapter Five, as will 
the factual deficits of the all-or-none ver-
sion of the action of the neuron. 
Also, there can be reactive problems 
when making a micro-level analysis of neu-
ral states. The apparatus required to mea-
sure firing of a given neuron may be 
responsible for changing the nature of the 
phenomenon under study. This problem 
worsens as the unit of analysis becomes 
smaller and progressively more basic in 
terms of a hierarchy of sciences This is not 
the only reactive problem, however. There 
is also the irony of the psychological beast 
studying the psychological beast. Harth 
(1982) explains: "The physiologists's task 
here is a peculiar one. He intercepts a mes-
sage somewhere in the neocortex and - by 
looking at oscilloscopes or reading graphs or 
listening to tapes - presents this message to 
the very periphery of his own nervous sys-
tem. But the code is inappropriate for that 
stage, and the message makes no sense" 
(Harth,1982 p74). This reactive problem is 
not peculiar to psychology, as with most 
sciences, the scientist constitutes,in type, at 
least part of the subject matter. Although 
reductive logic may recommend a reductive 
leap in order to escape the problem of the 
psychological beast studying the psycho-
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logical beast, it is contended here that this 
is not sufficient to escape this reflexive 
problem. 
It may be more useful to consider clusters 
or groups of neurons as the effective vehicles 
of psychological content in the reductionist 
programme. The gross properties of clusters 
of neurons may be more suitable as a focus for 
reductive analysis. If the analysis goes be-
yond the action potentials of individual 
neurons, then the aggregate properties of 
clusters or constellations lend themselves 
more easily to reductive links between 
psychology and neurophysiology (Harth 
1982). Gross measures can be made by non-in-
trusive methods that measure, for example, 
blood flow in various parts of the brain. This 
can be done by injecting a radioactive sub-
stance into the bloodstream and observing 
with scanning equipment the changes in 
blood flow that correlate with a given be-
haviour. 
Non-intrusive research methods that 
measure global processes from the outside 
can, to a certain extent, avoid the problem of 
the investigation changing the nature of the 
phenomenon in question. In atomistic fields 
the unit of analysis becomes small enough 
for the tools used to measure the unit, in this 
case the neuron, to interfere with the process 
of synaptic transmission. A global approach 
that monitors a large group of neurons has 
less chance of interfering with the action of 
any given neuron, with the compromise being 
that the correlations between the psycho-
logical activity and the neural activity be-
come more tenuous. However, as mentioned 
earlier, large clusters of neurons may repre-
sent psychological phenomena better than 
single neurons. Legitimate atomistic science 
attempts to tum correlative relationships as 
nearly as possible into "causal" relation-
ships, and attempts to provide an explana-
tion in terms of more basic phenomena, 
knowledge of which is seen to be provided 
by lower-level sciences. 
Taking a global physiological approach 
initially appears to avoid the reactive im-
plications of intruding into the skull, be-
cause the micro-level processes are seen to be 
relatively undisturbed. Gross measures pro-
vide a less extreme form of reductionism by 
allowing the aggregate properties of large 
numbers of neurons (this can be in the mil-
lions) to emerge. The following section will 
consider methodological reductionism at a 
gross level of analysis, at the level of local-
isation of function. However the reactive 
problems outlined earlier are still highly 
likely to be present - it is more likely to be a 
problem of minimising the effect of :1) the 
observer on the subject matter; and 2) the ob-
server being an example of the subject mat-
ter. 
Research Problems in 
Neurophysiology. 
Localisation of function. 
Localisation of function in mammalian 
brains is a feature of neural systems that 
makes it possible to assign bodily and be-
havioural functions to various parts of the 
brain. A given part of the brain (for exam-
ple, the hypothalamus) may contain or in-
volve several million neurons. Thus we have 
moved away from the atomistic neuronal 
analysis, and consider the aggregate 
properties of the neurons. A high degree of 
differentiation is evident from one end of 
the brain to the other. For most bodily func-
tions, there is a part of the brain that al-
lows a neurophysiologist to assert some sort 
correspondence between the activity in that 
part of the brain, and the topography of the 
bodily function. The older, more basic parts 
of the brain are at the rear, near the base of 
the brain. Vital bodily functions are im-
plicated in the function of this, the most 
primitive but best protected part of the 
brain. As we go forward from the base of the 
brain, the structures become increasingly 
newer and less central to the basic survival 
of the mammal. More peripheral functions 
are represented in intermediate areas, such 
as speech and voluntary motor activities. 
Towards the front of the brain are the most 
recent structures and these more cerebral ar-
eas are implicated with such functions as 
highly developed intellectual powers in 
humans. The highly developed cerebral 
cortex in humans accompanies a large degree 
of behavioural flexibility and an in-
ternalization of the many subtle rules and 
conditions that are required for successful 
operation in a complicated society. The 
continuity of cerebral advancement that ap-
pears as a function of increasingly higher 
levels of the phylogenetic continuum is well 
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documented. Even without an intrusive sci-
entific methodology, it can be seen that an-
imals with more advanced (not necessarily 
bigger) brain structures can do more and have 
a greater degree of behavioural flexibility 
than those lower on the phylogenetic con-
tinuum. 
The ability to localise the area of the 
brain concerned with a given behaviour has 
important implications for a reductionist 
scientific approach, especially regarding 
methodological matters. The ability to lo-
calize brain functions vindicates, to a certain 
extent, a methodology that investigates bi-
ological phenomena in the name of psy-
chology. A typical example would be, for 
instance, electrical stimulation of the lat-
eral hypothalamus of the rat (Carlson, 
1981). When stimulated in this way it eats 
continuously and gets fat. This provides 
some evidence to suggest that the lateral 
hypothalamic area is involved with eating. 
Since intrusive electrical stimulation is 
thought to simulate the natural activation 
of brain centres, the lateral hypothalamic 
area is hypothesised to be some sort of locus 
of eating initiation. This is a somewhat 
oversimplified account of a complicated 
biological and psychological phenomenon, 
but the intention here is not to provide an 
account of the ontological intricacies of a 
given example, but to illustrate the 
methodological manifestation of a reductive 
principle. 
The reductive principle that is being il-
lustrated by the lateral hypothalamus ex-
ample is that if one proceeds to investigate 
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the neural processes underlying a given be-
haviour, then one has a more basic and more 
real account of the phenomena under study. 
This sort of reasoning stems from the days 
when lower level sciences such as physics 
had a monopoly on reality. 
There are of course translation problems 
between the two sciences, such as were 
pointed out by Jessor (1958) and these will be 
discussed in Chapter Five. The localisation 
of function enables a deterministic inference 
to be made between the processes at two dif-
ferent levels. If function were not localised 
for bodily function, behaviour and subjective 
states, then reduction to physiology would 
be a somewhat more difficult task. 
The strict one-to-one relationship that 
localisation of function allows may have 
come under some threat from relatively re-
cent empirical developments in neurophysi-
ology. Extensive loss of nervous tissue from 
accidents or lesions has often been followed 
by a large degree of recovery or restitution in 
certain circumstances (Laurence & Stein, 
1978). To keep to the strict determinism 
that says certain brain structures have cer-
tain functions may involve ignoring the evi-
dence on recovery of function such as that 
presented by Laurence & Stein (1978). The 
ability of parts of the brain surrounding 
damaged areas to "take over" the function of 
the damaged area shows some variability 
in what was previously thought to be a 
fixed relationship. 
The recovery of behavioural function is 
not necessarily interpreted by Laurence & 
Stein (1978) as "plasticity" (which can refer 
to global changes in neural organisation as a 
result of damage, including the "taking 
over" of brain function by nearby areas) or 
reorganisation, especially if the brain-
damaged organism is able to compensate be-
haviourally. However, restoration of brain 
function is inferred when some degree of be-
havioural function is restored without 
"masking" by similar behaviours or novel 
tactics. Plasticity is considered by Laurence 
and Stein as a process of recovery of function. 
Alternative structural explanations listed 
by Laurence and Stein include redundancy, 
which is the possibility that sufficient spe-
cific tissue remains to do the job, and multi-
ple control, which localises a given function 
in several places. 
Process approaches to recovery of function 
(mechanisms which occur after the damage) 
are of greatest interest here, and include 
functional substitution (similar to multiple 
control), which refers to the taking over of 
the functions of the damaged areas by an-
other, and plasticity, as defined above. 
Plasticity is a feature found not only in 
brains that have been damaged, but also in 
normal, growing brains: "Shifts in function of 
CNS structures need not occur only in re-
sponse to brain injury, but may also be the 
natural consequence of development pro-
cesses that continue throughout life" (Gold-
man 1974; in Laurence & Stein 1978). This 
version of plasticity is the moderate ver-
sion. A weaker version of plasticity refers to 
such anatomical changes as "axonal sprout-
ing", and "regeneration", and a stronger ver-
sion refers to a continual transformation in 
global and specialized operations (Laurence 
& Stein 1978) that precludes the local-
isation of function entirely. If we stay with 
the moderate version for the time being, a 
pertinent question to address is: given that a 
shift in CNS function can occur as a process of 
recovery as well as normal development, can 
we keep a formal mapping relationship 
between psychology and physiology? 
This depends on the degree of precision 
that is demanded of the relationship be-
tween psychology and physiology (Clarke, 
1980). If brain function is only loosely local-
ized then it is possible to keep a reductive 
strategy if the conditions regarding success-
ful reduction are not so strict as to demand, 
for example, that a particular neural mech-
anism be found for a given psychological 
phenomenon. Another condition on successful 
reduction could involve the time factor, and 
would demand that particular identities 
obtain at every moment (Clarke, 1980) . As 
Clarke points out, this would be a very dif-
ficult condition to fulfil. To regard this con-
dition as necessary for successful reduction, 
one would have to conduct one's research 
with a faith in technology equal to that of 
Levinthal (1979), or admit methodological 
failure. 
Taking Laurence and Stein's (1978) ex-
treme version of the concept of plasticity, 
which says that the brain undergoes contin-
ual transformations that preclude the as-
signment of functions to neural localities, it 
would be appropriate to analyse the impli-
cations of this in terms of the degree of pre-
cision that is required of a reductive strat-
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egy. If localisation of function is an impossi-
ble objective in such a chaotic system, then 
one-to-one mappings of a strictly determin-
istic nature are of course completely ruled 
out. Can successful reductionism still be said 
to be achieved even though the method 
fails to reveal even the most vague of map-
ping relationships? This would force the 
loose localisation laws outlined earlier to be 
stretched to the point of absurdity, saying 
that there is a neurophysiological basis to 
behaviour but it cannot be pinned down. Thus 
methodological efforts to localize function 
in this extreme case fail, although the en-
deavour can still be considered reductionist 
because the explanatory investigation is 
still conducted at a "lower level" than that 
of the phenomenon to be explained. 
The System in Neural States 
Let us suppose that a one-to-one mapping 
relationship between a given psychological 
state and a specific neural state is difficult 
to infer. However, a many-to-one relation-
ship looks increasingly likely, and the 
structural concepts of multiple control or 
neurophysiological redundancy provide 
models that account for a set of hypotheti-
cal data. The concept of the system emerges 
as limitations in the one-to-one model be-
come too obvious to ignore . 
Complicated feedback systems gradually 
take over the explanatory role that one-to-
one mappings previously provided. Carlson 
(1981) states: "The term 'feedback' should be 
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self-explanatory: it refers to the conse-
quences of an action affecting the factors 
that initiate the action"p363. An internal 
feedback system, such as that of thirst regu-
lation, involves processes and cues from such 
diverse areas as neural centres, internal and 
external perceptual equipment, blood-borne 
cues etc. Carlson (1981) describes living be-
ings as open systems, exchanging energy and 
matter with their environments. A system 
such as O'Kelly's (1963) model of regulation 
portrays the internal environment of the bi-
ological unit as interacting with the physi-











Figure three. O'Kelly's model of regulation. 
In Carlson (1981,p363). 
This model can apply to thirst and other 
homeostatically controlled/ triggered 
physiological mechanisms. As systems begin 
to emerge in explanatory discourse regarding 
physiological variables, precise localis-
ation of function becomes a less feasible 
objective. The implications of a system-
based view of physiological processes for 
reductive determinacy are, however, not as 
extreme as those of Laurence & Stein's (1978) 
third definition of plasticity (continual 
transformation precluding localisation of 
function). The ontological status of an inter-
nal system does not appear to preclude 
localisation of function according to the 
Clarke (1980) loose criteria which allow for 
some indeterminacy without precluding suc-
cessful reduction. Systems within an indi-
vidual, as the unit of study, can still be 
thought of or examined in reductionist terms, 
but have implications of scale that may 
render reductionist strategy increasingly re-
dundant. The physiological system such as 
that which regulates thirst and drinking is 
considered "open" in that the sun, for exam-
ple, may dehydrate the individual. This 
analysis of the individual interacting with 
the wider environment pays some recogni-
tion to the concept of an individual being 
part of a larger system. However, this sys-
temic approach in physiology such as is 
represented by the O'Kelly model at best 
implies only that the individual is part of a 
wider physical system. At worst it merely 
states the obvious point that the physical 
system interacts with its environment. Thus 
thirst considered as a behavioural phe-
nomenon is still reduced to a physical phe-
nomenon, with the role of the physical 
environment being recognised. 
This raises the question: Is thirst a psy-
chological or physiological phenomenon? 
This would depend on the existence or extent 
of psychological content in the investigative 
theory or method used. One could class the 
inputs as including psychological concepts, 
e.g. "seeing someone drink". This brings the 
onus upon the physiologist to say when and 
how the psychological concepts become 
physiological (given that the reductive 
game is indispensable). The perceptual ap-
paratus may be cited as the interface be-
tween psychology and physiology. If one is 
to differentiate between psychological and 
physiological terms, then this problem-of 
where and how the psychological phenom-
ena become physiological phenomena re-
mains an ontological obstacle to good expla-
nation. Chapter Five will consider the 
epistemological problems of translation of 
terms between sciences. 
Summary. 
It appears that although an internal sys-
tems analysis provides a better picture than 
localisation of function, postulating the ex-
istence of an internal system still does not 
take into account the role of the physical or 
psychological environment. Considering 
physiological mechanisms as open feedback 
systems is an improvement but can still al-
low exclusive reference to the physical 
environment, ignoring possible psychologi-
cal explanations. When psychological con-
cepts are introduced, they are underdeter-
mined by physiology. Thus the open system 
concept lies open to some improvement, 
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which will be attempted in Chapter Four. 
A Problem of Causal Inference in 
Physiological Psychology. 
Part of the methodological approach in 
physiological psychology involves taking a 
psychological problem and citing some lower 
order variables that are thought to be 
involved with the psychological phe-
nomenon. When isolating physiological 
variables, it is usual to examine for or hy-
pothesise about the physiological states 
that immediately precede the psychologi-
cal phenomena. As will be seen in the chap-
ter on explanation, this unitary step back-
wards in the causal chain apparently 
constitutes adequate investigation for some 
problems. The physiological variable that 
is isolated is seen as the cause of the 
psychological phenomena. 
To resurrect the depression example, the 
faults in the synaptic clefts that are hy-
pothesised to cause the depletion of neuro-
transmitter in the sympathetic system of 
the brain can, at least in the case of endoge-
nous, biogenic depression, be thought of as 
"hard-wired". Reductionist efforts at 
changing the behaviour/ cognitions are di-
rected towards the "hardwired" problems 
that accompany the behavioural deficits, 
namely changing the physiological state. 
The problem of causal inference that 
arises in a case such as in a reductive analy-
sis of depression is that it is difficult to infer 
that the biological problem caused the 
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psychological deficits, given the possibility 
that the biological problem could have been 
"caused" by the depressive behaviour. If a 
long period of, for instance, exogenous de-
pressive behaviour could indeed "hardwire" 
the physiological symptom into the neural 
states, then a problem of causal inference of 
the "chicken & egg" variety is apparent. If 
it is accepted that in a given case, inferences 
about a neural deficit enables reliable 
predictions to be made about the 
behavioural state, then the possibility 
remains that the physiological deficit could 
have been set up much earlier in life, either 
by "learning" or by some physical effect of 
the environment. Since causal chains will be 
discussed in Chapter Three, it will suffice 
here to say that such causal uncertainties 
may be a result of the type of reductive 
method used, although this is not to say 
that any alternative methods are necessar-
ily crystal-clear regarding causal inference. 
CHAPTER THREE 
Explanation, Causation and 
Reductionism 
This chapter deals mainly with explana-
tion, causation, and description in psychol-
ogy, in preparation for Chapter Four which 
will examine the capacity for reductive 
analysis to provide an account of each of 
these. Firstly it is appropriate to attempt to 
say what it means to have an explanation in 
psychology. One possible answer to this is 
that explanation is an attempt to render 
something intelligible (Valentine, 1982). 
The Collins English Dictionary (Hanks, 
1985) defines "explanation" as "to make 
(something) comprehensible, especially by 
giving a clear and detailed account of the 
relevant structure, operation, surrounding 
circumstances etc". Without entering the 
circularity that the dictionary definition 
entails, the first problem we strike when we 
attempt to define explanation, is that we 
must employ some sort of explanation to 
define it. On the face of it, a reference to 
intelligibility or comprehensibility appears 
to ground the term "explanation" in 
something external, but we may not be able 
to step outside an explanatory mode in order 
to avoid a non-circular definition. However 
in order to provide a coherent account of ex-
planation this reflexive problem will be ig-
nored. 
The second problem with the definition -
"renders something comprehensible or intel-
ligible" - is that it is nowhere near specific 
enough. If psychology is regarded as an em-
pirical as well as a theoretical exercise, 
then the question of what renders a problem 
or question "intelligible" must be answered 
in terms that are at least more specific than 
the question. Specificity can appear, for ex-
ample, in the operational terms that are 
generated from an explanatory theory. The 
following section will briefly outline some 
types of explanation occurring in psychol-
ogy, leading into a discussion of theories of 
knowledge and their relation to the entities 
that require explaining. 
Explanations in psychology and science 
can often, but not necessarily, refer to some-
thing that happened in the past. The state 
or phenomenon or process to be explained is 
considered as a temporal unit of analysis, 
fixed in time or bounded by an interval. This 
unit is taken in abstraction from the continu-
ity of events that presumably exists inde-
pendently of analytic observation. The 
given temporal unit may then be explained 
in terms of the events and processes that 
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preceded it. The scientific study of the 
ontological world proceeds following the 
assumption that certain states follow cer-
tain other states in a deterministic fashion. 
If event A is considered as being caused, it 
need not necessarily follow that event A 
must be found to be sufficiently caused 
(Katz, 1983), allowing for some indetermi-
nacy to emerge from scientific investigation. 
Explanation in psychology is not neces-
sarily restricted to causality. Teleological 
explanations, which explain phenomena in 
terms of purpose, or functional explanations, 
which focus on associations between events, 
are not intended to be evaluated from a 
causal perspective (Valentine, 1982). 
Valentine makes the point that there is no 
point in evaluating one type of explanation 
from the viewpoint of another. This relates 
to a point Garfinkel (1981) makes in consid-
eration of Kuhnian paradigmatic factors in 
explanation. Shifts in the explanatory 
framework occur over time, in response to the 
old framework becoming increasingly unable 
to account for observed phenomena. 
Technological advances, (mentioned in 
Chapter Two) are seen here as being 
contributory to reductionism as a problem by 
providing the incremental knowledge that 
maintains the reductionist's faith in the 
reductive process, may provide the ob-
servations which stretch the "old" frame-
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work to the limit. Garfinkel refers to the 
shifting of the conceptual frameworks not as 
a change in the answers given, but as a 
change in the sorts of questions asked. For 
example, in physics, the reply to the ques-
tion "why do objects keep moving?" became 
"they just keep moving". This problem con-
cerned the theoretical shift from medieval 
to Newtonian physics (Garfinkel, 1981). 
Newton offered a new question, that of why 
the motion of an object changes. When the 
best available answer seems somewhat vac-
uous with regard to the question, then the 
limit of the explanatory framework has 
been reached: "Attending to the questions 
rather than the answers and looking for the 
implicit question hiding behind the answer 
are a useful device for analysing explana-
tions and understanding historical shifts. In 
general, epochs in history, the history of 
science or any other history, are marked by 
the questions they asked as by the answers 
they give." Garfinkel, (1981),p8. 
The Garfinkel (1981) quotation has 
served to introduce the idea that conceptual 
frameworks are subject to periodic change. A 
relatively recent conceptual shift in physics 
concerns the field of quantum physics, where 
the question "what is the nature of matter?" 
changed to "docs matter exist?" Koestler, 
(1959). Explanation can even involve two 
different conceptual frameworks operating 
on the same data, when for example, an 
electron is considered sometimes as a wave 
and other times as a particle (March,1978), 
or when in cognitive psychology, 
"associative network theory" and "semantic 
feature theory" account for the same set of 
data (Wickelgren,1981). When 
observational data can support more than 
one theory, the criteria for sufficient 
investigation are usually insufficient for 
adequate determination of the theory or 
model being used. Technological advances 
are seen here from a post-Kuhnian perspec-
tive as helping to precipitate a conceptual 
shift, but not being enough in themselves to 
account for paradigmatic shifts. It may not 
be changes in technological knowledge that 
change a conceptual framework, as much as 
the less quantifiable conceptual shifts that 
result from such advances. 
Explanation Through Theory. 
Three terms above have been used virtually 
interchangeably, namely "theory", "para-
digm" and "conceptual framework". Al-
though the terms "paradigm" and "concep-
tual framework" are used here to say the 
same thing, the term "theory" is somewhat 
more specific, and refers to low-level 
propositions that can be abstracted from 
data. These propositions (Valentine, 1982) 
can consist of symbolic representations of: 1) 
observed relationships among measured 
events; 2) the mechanisms or structures pre-
sumed to underlie such relationships; or 3) 
inferred relationships and underlying 
mechanisms. Theories can be ideas about the 
world, and they differ from data by one 
level of abstraction. Data too can be seen as 
theoretical, in that certain "pretheoretical" 
and theoretical assumptions are manifest in 
the way data are collected. For example, 
the decision to investigate the role of the 
hypothalamus in enraged behaviour follows 
from an assumption that neural inves-
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tigation provides a more basic account of the 
phenomena than a within-level analysis. 
However, even before the method of inves-
tigation is chosen, there are assumptions 
present that represent theoretical view-
points, for example that experimental data 
provide a type of knowledge that is superior 
to experiential data. Fell (1977) called 
phenomenal experience "pre-theoretical" in 
that experiential considerations are brought 
to the experimental context. However, Fell's 
"pretheoretical" concepts will be treated 
here as "theoretical", due to an assumed 
theoretical (not necessarily scientised) 
nature of experience. 
Seeing experience as pre-theoretical ac-
cords ontological (factual) status to experi-
ence above that of the theoretical. This 
traditional view treats data as providing a 
"special window" to the world. Although 
both theory and experience are seen to have 
similar theoretical status, it is postulated 
that data and the resulting theory can in 
some cases have lower "ontological 'valid-
ity" (in other words, is a less adequate the-
ory of facts) than experience due to a degree 
of abstraction from the ontological world 
resulting from badly operationalised con-
structs (poor measurement). For example, if 
complex cognitive and emotional processes 
are measured by bipolar responses on a paper 
questionnaire, then the subsequent theory is 
based on data obtained at a more abstract 
level, leaving the theory somewhat under-
determined by the supporting data. In a case 
such as this, the data and the subsequent 
theory can have somewhat lower 
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"ontological validity" than experiential 
data. 
The preceding discussion serves to intro-
duce the concept that explanation in psy-
chology is attempted largely through the-
ory, whether explicit or implicit. Theories 
can carry the burden of explanatjon, conse-
quently the strengths and weaknesses of a 
given theory, to some extent represent the 
adequacy of the explanation. A working as-
sumption in this thesis is that explanation 
is a reasonable objective in psychological 
endeavour. Practical considerations such as 
problem solving or accountability to outside 
interests are seen as "flowing on" from good 
explanation. 
There are several different types of ex-
planation available in psychology (Valen-
tine, 1982), including causal, functional, 
teleological, structural, generalisatory and 
hermeneutic. The first four will be con-
sidered here with the greatest emphasis 
being placed on the contrast between firstly, 
causal accounts and secondly, structural and 
functional accounts. 
Causal Explanation 
A good causal account has an historical as-
pect to it that the structural account does not 
have (Valentine, 1982). and recognises 
cause-effect relationships over time. Causal 
relationships can be described in a number of 
different ways, and three outlooks that 
provide differing views of causal explana-
tion are the realist, Humean and deductive-
nomological views. The latter two views 
will be merged later in the chapter into one 
"standard view of science", after Manicas 
and Secord (1983). The Humean concept of 
causality follows a "billiard ball" model, 
where a sufficient cause is based on a mea-
surable cause having a measurable effect. 
Valentine (1982) cited two essential ingre-
dients to be conditionality and relevance: 
"Thus, the occurrence of an event B is ex-
plained as being the result of an antecedent 
A having occurred , A being a condition for 
B"plOO. 
Such a causal account allows for some in-
determinacy to occur between cause and ef-
fect as the time gap between sufficient cause 
and effect increases. The closer the temporal 
relationship between cause and effect, the 
more confident one can be about making 
determinative statements regarding the re-
lation of the hypothesised cause to the ef-
fect. 
In psychology, cause and effect are usu-
ally mediated in some way by the biological 
organism. Frequently the inputs and the 
outputs are measured. In a causal account of 
behaviour, this may be all that is required 
for sufficient explanation. In a structural ac-
count, the topography of the outputs may 
take second place to inferences regarding 
the structure or function of something that 
lies within the boundaries of the biological 
organism. The structural account treats the 
internal workings of an organism as an 
interesting object of study in itself. 
The Humean concept of causality as in-
terpreted in psychological work relates 
cause and effect through an organism, but not 
necessarily explicating the internal work-
ings of the organism. The behavioural 
tradition in psychology has stressed the 
probabilistic relationship between stimulus 
and response, and has applied "laws" of 
learning to demonstrate the important role 
of the immediate environment in the 
determination of behaviour. Behavioudsts 
also stress the importance of conditioning 
histories. This probabilistic, retrospective 
relationship was taken to a philosophical 
extreme in Skinner's radical behaviourism, 
which sought to eliminate the role of the 
biological organism in the prediction and 
control of behaviour. Skinner himself saw 
radical behaviourism as a philosophy 
(Skinner, 1974), although the impact of be-
havioural science on psychology has proba-
bly been more pragmatic than philosophi-
cal. However, it is not the purpose of this 
chapter to give an account of behaviourism. 
Skinner rejected the concept of explanation 
as a suitable goal for psychology 
(explanation misleading the scientist into 
wasting time on "explanatory fictions") 
preferring prediction and control as more 
suitable objectives. The purpose of mention-
ing behaviourism then, in a chapter on ex-
planation, is to outline the influence of be-
havioural psychology on a discipline that 
takes explanatory tasks seriously. This in-
fluence leads to making theoretical concepts 
more accountable to the ontological world 
through the process of measurement - an as-
tute analysis of behaviour enables the 
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theoretical constructs or models to be well 
· represented in data. The Skinnerian legacy 
helps us to avoid, for example, the indeter-
minate excesses of the Freudian psychody-
namic system, and helps "close the gap" be- . 
tween stimulus and response to facilitate 
more accuracy in the theoretical excursions 
of psychologists. 
The second view of causal explanation to 
be mentioned here is the "realist" view, al-
though this will not be explicated in great 
detail. The realist outlook as described by 
Manicas and Secord (1983) incorporates the 
view (very briefly) that data do not provide 
"givens" on which the test of truth is corre-
spondence, and epistemologically, there can 
be nothing "known" with which theories 
and constructs can be compared. In spite of 
this, according to Manicas and Secord, " ... it 
is precisely the task of science to invent 
theories that aim to represent the 
,world"(p401). Realist philosophy of science 
assumes that there is a "real·0 world" that 
exists independently of the conscious efforts 
of scientists and other people. 
Since all knowledge in a realist philoso-
phy is "theoretical", the elevated 
ontological status that traditional science 
accords data is seen as invalid, reinforcing a 
point made earlier in the chapter that 
muddies the distinction between experience 
and data. The direction of this is important, 
however: data are reduced to experience; 
experience is not reduced to data. The realist 
takes it that there are real things about 
which to theorise, and looks at the world 
through theory (the only possible way), 
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wherein lies a problem: if theory is the only 
way we can look at the world, then what 
basis is there for a believing that there is a 
real world apart from the fact that we have 
theory? One can, however, see the prag-
matic value in the belief, since it gives the 
researcher something to work for. Leary 
(1984) questioned the status of a realist on-
tology given the fallibilist epistemology of 
the realist: "Exactly how Manicas and Sec-
ord propose to link experience - which they 
propose to be culturally mediated - with re-
ality independent from experience is an issue 
I shall leave for them to clarify"(p918). It 
appears that one must take on the realist 
belief in a real world in order to see theory 
as the real world's representative. 
However if we accept at least that 
knowledge operates in an inescapable theo-
retical mode, the realist programme allows 
for the use of theoretical constructs that the 
Humean programme cannot cope with. In 
striving to explain problems in psychology, 
the realist research paradigm enables the 
psychologist to infer internal states that at 
least help to put together an adequate ex-
planation of behaviour. 
The deductive-nomothetic view of sci-
ence as described by Manicas and Secord 
(1984) "presupposes that the world is a de-
termined concatenation of contingent ev-
ents", and allows theory to yield data that 
have an ontological claim on reality but 
contrasts with the new realism in that the 
deductive-nomothetic view of science at-
tempts to provide "givens", from which sci-
ence can progress. 
Pragmatic Explanations 
A type of explanation that is worth men-
tioning but will not be detailed at length is 
the pragmatic explanation, which gives the 
phenomenon in question an explanation 
which is suitable according to the situation-
specific conditions at the time. Such prag-
matism may of course be better thought of as 
a criterion for assessing the adequacy of an 
explanation. An example of a pragmatic ex-
planation in psychology could be when the 
elucidation of a physiological process en-
ables a person to make adaptive attributions 
regarding the reasons for certain behaviours. 
For example, the explanation to a highly 
stressed person who drinks ten cups of coffee 
a day, that this consumption raises the 
level of central nervous system stimulant to 
such a level that normal functioning is im-
paired, is likely to prevent that person from 
generalising the source of the stress to inap-
propriate areas, or the explanation may 
simply ground the source of the arousal in 
something physical, making the person feel 
better. A pragmatic explanation could be 
loosely defined as anything that "works". 
The pragmatic criterion may well be one of 
the strongest sources of support for 
reductionist arguments, as the field of psy-
chology can often be complemented by a 
knowledge of physiological underpinnings. 
However, pragmatism is not the only crite-
rion worth considering when assessing ex-
planation in academic activity, and prob-
lems can arise when the reductive explana-
tion is seen in itself as good explanation or 
good psychology. Other criteria for assess-
ing an explanation in psychology as a science 
can include parsimony, extent to which new 
information can be supplied, internal consis-
tency, or degree of reference to the ontologi-
cal world. 
Causation and Description 
Causal accounts as explanatory vehicles can 
be seen to lie on a continuum between the 
Humean regular conjunctions, and the realist 
theorising about hidden generative mecha-
nisms. Although causal accounts can vary in 
the extent to which they are based on an 
attempt to generate hidden mechanisms as 
mediators of the inputs and outputs of the 
biological unit, they are generally similar 
in that they provide an historical 
dimension to the explanatory picture. Ex-
planations that posit the structure or process 
of internal workings can be relatively de-
void of historical content, whilst the 
probabilistic relationships observed in a 
behavioural research mode may provide 
more historical content with an emphasis on 
dispositions to respond based on learning 
histories. The Humean concept of causality 
when applied as a set of probabilistic rela-
tionships between antecedents and conse-
quences results in a retrospective science 
which makes predictions on an inductive 
basis. 
The concept of cause as providing an ex-
planation is useful in that a relation of cause 
to effect helps to render the problem more 
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comprehensible or intelligible, although a 
full set of causes may not be necessary in 
cases where pointing only to those changes 
which "tip the balance" appears sufficient 
(Manicas & Secord, 1984). This view of cau-
sation sees "causes" as being restricted to the 
precipitant factors involved in a deter-
minative chain. The relates to the notion of 
"partial causation" which will be outlined 
later in the chapter. However, when 
precipitate causes such as "the marriage 
broke up because the car broke down" become 
insufficient for good explanation, it then 
becomes appropriate to go back further in 
the causal chain. 
The reductive explanation in psychology 
yields information that infers effects ema-
nating from within the organism. This car-
ries implications of blame (touched on in 
Chapter Four in a discussion of individual-
ism), although the deterministic links 
sought in the scientific world, would in the-
ory contribute to an absolving of blame in in-
dividuals. The observer looks "downwards" 
for causes that are seen to act in an "upward" 
direction. Garfinkel's (1981) notion of par-
tial causation is relevant here, a concept 
that relegates the popular scientific notion 
of "cause" to being better described as a pre-
cipitant. The common conception of a causal 
chain is reinterpreted as a chain of precipi-
tation. Garfinkel claims that the term 
"cause" is often restricted to those factors 
which it is possible to control - thus a prag-
matic element shapes the definition of a 
cause. Given these reservations, figure four 
illustrates the multiple directions of causal 
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influence between physiology, psychology 
and the environment in an effort to demon-
strate the simplicity of the reductive route 





Figure four. Diagram showing directions of 
possible causal influence in psychological 
research. 
The complexity of figure four serves to il-
lustrate the convenience of choosing a simple 
cause-effect reductive link. By limiting the 
investigative scope to one regressive step, 
the problem may appear to lend itself to a 
reductive strategy in the deductive-nomo-
thetic mode. Causes in the deductive-nomo-
thetic view are seen as a long chain of small 
cause-effect relationships, and questions re-
lating to this, such as the time gap between 
cause and effect, or what constitutes a 
temporal unit of analysis, or even what is a 
moment in time, are interesting but beyond 
the scope of this thesis. 
If the behaviour of people or organisms is 
seen as being caused in a long, deterministic 
chain of cause and effect, then we have a 
state of infinite regress (Valentine, 1982). As 
the causal chain is taken further back in 
time, each step may become increasingly less 
causal and more descriptive as the deter-
minants become more remote. This may ef-
fectively render the search for causation a 
purely descriptive exercise. 
Going back to Manicas and Secord (1983), 
they interpret the "standard view of sci-
ence" as explaining phenomena through 
laws. They describe a full or complete ex-
planation as deductive-nomothetic (gener-
ating laws from which predictions about the 
world can be made), although in research 
practice, Manicas and Secord say that ex-
planations are inductive-statistical. The 
laws in the deductive-nomothetic mode are 
generated from the observation of contingent 
events, these events being related to each 
other in a probabilistic fashion. From the 
contingencies already observed, inductive 
reasoning leads to the postulation of laws 
which enable deductions to be made about 
the future. 
This standard view of science, as men-
tioned earlier,. is epitomised in Skinner's 
radical behaviourism. How does a reductive 
approach fit in with Manicas and Secord's 
standard view of science? Initially, a 
reduction from psychology to physiology 
(for example explicating neural structures 
involved in depression) appears to have 
something of a realist orientation, although 
realism does not require one to be a 
reductionist. However, it must be remem-
bered that the limits of determination per-
mitted by physical measurement techniques 
in neurophysiology allow, at best, a close 
correlation between psychology and physi-
ology to be postulated. The correlation be-
tween psychology and physiology enables 
retroductive inferences to be made that say 
that a certain internal state "controls" a 
certain behaviour. The relationship be-
tween the two levels of phenomena is still a 
contingent relationship between events, and 
not necessarily a "contingent concatenation 
of real structures". Therefore, reductive 
psychology appears to fit in with Manicas 
and Secord's standard view of science that 
extends inductive-statistical relationships 
into deductive laws. 
To conclude, the problem that remains is 
that whilst a reductionist strategy may 
well produce adequate deductive-nomoth-
etic science, it is contended here that the 
descriptive account of the reductive-causal 
research strategy may still be inadequate 
for good explanation, due to the lack of scope 
in the description that reductive science 
provides. Thus a reductive explanation pro-
vides a descriptive account of the states or 
processes of limited scope at a lower level of 
science. These reductive explanations are 
based on the idea that theory A is reducible 
to theory B if B explains all the observation 
sentences from theory A. The descriptive or 
explanatory power of reductive psychology 
will be critically discussed in the next two 
chapters. Chapter Four will continue the 
theme of explanation in psychology, and 
will relate explanations to the various lev-
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Levels of Sciences 
A Hierarchy of Sciences 
Before the epistemological or linguistic 
treatment of the discussion of translation 
problems between different theoretical lev-
els in the next chapter, it is appropriate to 
describe the concept of levels of scientific 
theory in some detail. An ordered hierarchy 
of sciences is a key proposition behind the 
doctrine of reductionism (Jessor, 1958; Rose, 
1985; Hodgson; 1985). 
This sort of conceptual scheme predis-
poses or at least goes along with a method-
ological assumption that certain methods of 
enquiry yield some sort of more basic infor-
mation than within-level explanations. The 
postulation of a hierarchy implies that the 
lower levels have some sort of factual 
(ontological) priority over the higher levels 
(Rose,1982), although this priority is not 
endorsed here. This information has a 
greater generality or applicability due to 
being at a level that is distributed more 
widely. For example, genetic material is es-
sential for determining many characteristics 
of human biology and to a certain extent, be-
haviour, but is also found in all forms of life 
on earth.Thus a reductive approach in psy-
chology may investigate the genetic basis of 
a particular pathological state, but the ge-
netic material yields information of far 
wider applicability. 
The levels of sciences here are considered 
as conceptual levels, although in scientific 
work they are also taken to represent levels 
of systems or processes. Consequently the 
method of enquiry that follows from the 
conceptual hierarchy through a faith in 
levels of systems, is a method whereby the 
activities and structures of the lower-level 
system are measured and manipulated. The 
application in psychology of this method 
was the subject of Chapter Two, where the 
nature of the neurophysiological apparatus 
was briefly outlined. 
The sciences can be arranged in hierar-
chical form from the lower-order to the 
higher-order, in a list that usually runs from 
physics or sub-atomic physics to social 
sciences such as sociology, and includes all 
the disciplines between the two extremes. 
The actual contents of the list can vary 
somewhat from account to account, but a 
typical such list might look like figure five. 
At the bottom of the hierarchy, the more 
fundamental components of the world are in-
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vestigated. Moving upwards, a standard as-
sumption is that sciences or disciplines of 
increasing complexity are revealed until the 










Figure five. The conventional hierarchy of 
sciences (from Rose,1985). 
The size and scope of the unit of analysis 
changes by degree, and some would say by 
kind, in the progression from one step to the 
next. A reason to say that the sciences differ 
in their content in kind would be to preserve 
a role for a given science. The dilemma here 
is that the uniqueness of a science intu-
itively precludes reduction. Reduction taken 
to its logical extreme is an exercise in actu-
ally stripping a science of its identity by re-
ducing its content to that of lower-level sci-
ences. The identity of a science has a lot to 
do with content. For example, it is difficult 
to say, as with neural identity theory, that 
"depression is a problem of biology", since it 
isn't in itself. If "depression" is called 
"biology" then two different words for the 
same problem render one term redundant. 
The concept of a hierarchy of sciences en-
ables certain links to be made between the 
sciences, particularly the ascription of lev-
els of sciences, and enables some disciplines 
to be seen as more basic through the wider 
generality (mentioned earlier), precision, 
parsimony and applicability. Rose (1985) 
warns that the notion of a hierarchy of sci-
ences implies that the lower level sciences 
have a factual priority. It is argued here 
that this is not problem, and that the argu-
ment can be turned on its head to argue that 
the existence of higher-level disciplines 
implies that their complexity be recog-
nised. 
Two alternative ways of looking at the 
success of reductive methods emerge: 1) ei-
ther the modern attempts at reductive prob-
lem-solving are reinforced by the practical 
nature of the reductive solutions (with re-
duction also providing an adequate 
explanatory framework for the time); 2) or 
the world may indeed be composed in an 
atomistic manner, with reductionist analy-
sis providing scientists with a monopoly on 
reality. Although this is something of a 
"chicken-and-egg" problem, this writer 
would tend to favour the former way of 
looking at reduction. Of course a dedicated 
reductionist would say that the former as-
sertion is successful because the latter asser-
tion is true. 
A hierarchy of sciences enables lower-
order sciences such as physics to claim to be 
part of a higher order sciences such as psy-
chology, although the reductive leap usu-
ally only involves a jump of one level, for 
example psychology may be reduced to 
physiology, or biology may be reduced to 
chemistry. Also, the direction of reduction is 
invariably downward, to the level immedi-
ately below that at which the target phe-
nomenon is situated. Modern or post-Newto-
nian science has of course scored some spec-
tacular successes by taking a phenomenon out 
of its home domain and reducing to a lower 
level. "Reduction upwards" can occur where 
the explanation is taken from a level above 
the target level. An example from biology 
would be where the explanation for a prob-
lem such as coronary illness (Lagerspetz, 
1984) lies in the psychological domain of 
stress or emotional imbalance. The notion of 
reduction upwards still involves a simplifi-
cation by referring to a single concept at a 
higher level. This bears some relation to the 
Llewelyn & Kelly (1980) term "sociol-
ogism", where psychology is dissolved into 
abstract notions involving society. Llewelyn 
& Kelly see it as being important that some 
agency or individualism is retained in 
psychology. This has some similarity to the 
notion of "downward causation" where the 
higher-level laws determine the distri-
bution of lower-level events and substances 
(Campbell, 1974), but is far less systematic. 
Single concepts, whether reduced upwards or 
downwards, will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
The "top-down" explanation imposes 
higher-level variables on the target phe-
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nomenon. This type of explanation goes some 
way toward integrating the target level into 
a system - the target phenomenon is thus 
seen as part of a larger whole. The top-down 
explanation provides a teleonomic or goal-
directed explanation whilst avoiding the 
teleological concept of purpose (Rose, 1985). 
The top-down explanation is the most likely 
sort of explanation to stray from physio-
logical facts. 
Within-level explanations relate cause 
and effect without recourse to different sci-
entific levels of theory. Thus a psychologi-
cal explanation for depression may involve 
variables that lie in the psychological do-
main, such as reinforcement schedules. The 
within-level explanation has a certain 
simplicity that does not beg questions of 
translations between it and lower levels. 
There are no problems of overlap of terms 
and no demarcation problems with other 
levels, since the other levels of science are 
largely ignored. Also, there are,,no arbitrary 
decisions to make as to where ,to limit the 
search for the ever-decreasing units of anal-
ysis. Reductionists would worry that the 
within-level mode of explanation may al-
low the enquiry to continue in possibly un-
fruitful directions, untrammeled by the 
"harder" facts provided by the lower-level 
science. There is some merit in this assertion 
, - psychological models that stray too far 
from the underlying physiological corre-
lates (e.g. Freud's psychodynamic model) 
can lose their value as good explanations 
and lead to wasted research. The use of 
models as reductive tools will be discussed in 
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Chapter Five. 
"Bottom-up" explanations are the do-
main of reductive analysis. These explana-
tions use information from the lower-level 
domain to investigate the target phe-
nomenon. Such explanations have consider-
able credibility in scientific circles. The 
wholes are broken down into parts with the 
parts being studied. There is some commit-
ment to "build up" the parts again into some 
sort of whole, but it is contended here that 
this often does not occur, and is a task not 
taken seriously by reductionist researchers. 
In psychology journals, if any synthesis or 
building-up of the theoretical concepts is 
done, it is usually restricted to the more 
speculative parts of the discussion. 
Going from the lower end of the hierar-
chy to the higher end, the size and scope of 
the unit of analysis changes. Each upward 
step involves a broadening of the scope of 
the unit of analysis. 
Two diagrams illustrate the perspective 
from within two disciplines that lie at each 
end of the hierarchy - psychology and 
physics (figures 6a & 6b). Each diagram 
emphasises a different perspective accord-
ing to how it would appear from within the 
discipline. In physics the stress is on gener-
ality, whereas in psychology the stress is on 
levels of complexity. The term generality 
refers to the fact that the repor~ed content of 
physics and chemistry constitutes at least 
part of all the other sciences. Complexity 
here refers to the fact that from the 
perspective of a hierarchy of sciences, many 
sciences contribute to the make-up of a 
discipline such as psychology. The reductive 
view which sees physics as some sort of fun-
damental science undoubtedly stems from a 
time when physics had a good grasp of of 
reality, and had an infinite generality. The 
elusive indeterminacies of quantum physics, 
however, appear to represent an end-point 
to the gradual transition between sciences 
that encourages the notion of a hierarchy. 
To a certain extent, the hard realities re-
ported by conventional physics and higher 
sciences are called into question by such 
problems as: the more that is known about 
the velocity of an electron, the less is known 
about its position (the Heisenberg princi-
ple); the mystery of the quantum leap; and 
even the counter-intuitive notion that the 
furniture we sit on is composed largely of 
empty space (Koestler, 1959). 
In the light of these sorts of problems, 
the word "atomistic", used to describe the 
method and analysis of reductive science 
loses the descriptive power of referring to 
the smallest unit possible. Derived from the 
word "atom" the term "atomistic" now no 
longer is derived from the most fundamental 
unit available, unless the term is inter-
preted as representing a search for the 
smallest units at any level. In physics the 
problem of the ever-diminishing unit of 
matter has been avoided to a certain extent 
by conceptualising structures as energy fields 
(Llewelyn & Kelly, 1980). 
The notion of a hierarchy of sciences is 
taken here to mean that lower-level sciences 
make up at least part of the content of 
higher-level sciences. Given that certain 
Generality 
PHYSICS PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY 
Figure 6a. Figure 6b 
Figures 6a & 6b. The differing perspectives from two different ends of the 
hierarchy of sciences. From within physics, generality is stressed. 
Fromwithin psychology and sociology, complexity is stressed (adapted 
from Vollmer, 1984). 
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indeterminacies occur at a very basic level, 
is it then reasonable to expect that these in-
determinacies are reflected in increasingly 
higher levels? The very concept of a 
hierarchy of sciences would lead us to expect 
so. Recent developments in the field of 
"chaos" theory in physics throws some doubt 
on the strict determinism that is supposed to 
link the sciences in a hierarchy. Crutch-
field, Doyne Farmer, Packard, & Shaw 
(1986) hold that in a simple system such as 
is represented by a billiard-ball model of 
causality, small uncertainties in the initial 
collisions are magnified with each collision, 
so that the effect becomes unpredictable in a 
very short time. 
There is, according to Crutchfield et al 
(1986) an "exponential amplification of er-
rors" that ensures that prediction in certain 
types of system is impossible. They present a 
paradox whereby uncertainties are magni-
fied very quickly, precluding prediction, but 
"on the other hand, the determinism inher-
ent in chaos implies that many random 
phenomena are more predictable than had 
been thought"(p38). 
Crutchfield et al (1986) describe geomet-
ric forms that create randomness in ordered 
ways, however it is the amplification of 
uncertainties that is of interest here. The 
implications for reductionism of chaos the-
ory appear to be that the uncertainties of 
quantum mechanics, combined with the am-
plification of chaotic effects as we move up 
the hierarchy of sciences render a determin-
istic reductive link between any two sciences 
to be on highly dubious foundations. 
However, it would be somewhat prema-
ture in psychology to say that quantum 
physics combined with chaos explains 
something like human behavioural unpre-
dictability. Human behavioural unpre-
dictability may be more parsimoniously at-
tributed to chaos at the behavioural level. 
Thus Crutchfield et al (1986) still appear to 
hold with the reductionist assumptions of a 
hierarchy of sciences. 
The Unit of Analysis in Psychology 
The unit of analysis in a given science is an 
important part of how that science gains its 
identity. Some independence from the units 
of analysis of adjoining sciences is necessary, 
although some overlap of research territory 
is to be expected. The reductive tradition in 
psychology has focused on what will be 
called the "biological unit", which refers to 
the being within the physical bounds of the 
body. Such concepts as "personal space" ex-
tend this boundary a little but not to a great 
extent. This section will examine the nature 
and place of this biological unit in psychol-
ogy. 
Towards the end of Chapter Two an at-
tempt was made to show that the difference 
between analysing the role of a neuron and 
analysing the role of certain centres con-
taining millions of neurons represented a 
shift in the unit of analysis by one level up-
wards as properties of localisation of func-
tion emerged. It will be taken here that 
emergent properties indicate that a new 
level of analysis has been reached, thus 
taking a functional rather than structural 
approach. Unfortunately the demarcation 
line between one level and the next, and be-
tween one scientific domain and the next can 
be rather vague, especially when more than 
one type of discipline can lay claim to the 
same observed content. The large number of 
neurons (ten billion) in the brain could lead 
the researcher to believe that many of the 
secrets of human behaviour would be en-
coded within. With the progression from 
localisation of function to larger units such 
as the cortexes, the brain as a whole pre-
sents a deeply complex series of systems 
through which theories at different levels 
from biology down can postulate theoretical 
entities. This view of the biological unit as 
a self-contained whole is one which will be 
returned to later. 
A Hierarchy of Systems. 
This topic, dealt with again in Chapter 
Five by being contrasted with a hierarchy of 
sciences, is one which considers the world to 
be a set of systems at many levels that in-
teract in ordered yet highly complex ways. 
Systems are seen as real entities that can be 
observed with varying degrees of success by 
levels of theories, and comprise the content 
of the various levels of theory. Systems are 
thus seen to produce the stimuli for observa-
tion. The hierarchy of systems is not a con-
ventional ladder-type hierarchy as the hi-
erarchy of sciences presents, instead it runs 
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from the top downwards in a sort of inverted 
tree (Koestler, 1967). This reflects the in-
creasing generality of the contents of disci-
plines lower on the hierarchy of sciences. 
Seeing a phenomenon at any level, for ex-
ample alcoholism, as a product of interlock-
ing systems at levels above and below the 
psychological level presents a method-
ologically more difficult task than the 
reductive paradigm prescribes, since no clear 
direction in which to move is outlined. 
Several levels appear as possible ex-
planatory sources for this example: 1) possi-
ble genetic factors; 2) physiological depen-
dence; 3)behavioural acquisition and main-
tenance; 4) norms on social drinking; and 5) 
inequities in the power structure of society. 
Note that the list ascends levels of systems 
in linear fashion. To attempt to take all 
such levels into account presents a scien-
tist/practitioner with a quandary that may 
not affect either a scientist or a practitioner. 
The problem lies in the constraints set by the 
scientific method that was developed fn the 
reductive mode. In order to deal with the 
problem in a complete manner, several lev-
els may need to be taken into account, but 
this interferes with the requirement of sci-
ence to produce well-controlled data that 
manipulates or tests one variable whilst 
controlling all others (to a certain extent, 
this is where the hierarchy of systems, re-
quiring a multi-level approach comes into 
conflict with the hierarchy of sciences 
which requires a rigorous, controlled ap-
proach). 
The reductive tradition in psychology 
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would prescribe a downward search for the 
"controlling variables" of the alcoholic be-
haviour. In order to glean a scientifically 
respectable explanation and make sense of 
the mess of available data sources, the re-
ductive tradition encourages a narrowing 
down of the field of enquiry to the next 
lower level. This facilitates the use of a 
univariate testing procedure that attempts 
to manipulate one independent variable 
whilst keeping all others constant. This 
tendency to control the rest of the world 
whilst focussing on target variables in a sort 
of vacuum is a type of reduction in itself that 
relies on single concepts at any level for ex-
planatory purposes. The problems of exter-
nal validity (generality) that the univari-
ate tradition has brought to psychology will 
not be detailed here, although single con-
cepts in psychology will get a cursory airing 
later in the chapter. 
The Phylogenetic Continuum 
The differential capabilities of biological 
organisms at differing points on the phylo-
genetic continuum is a concern of Koestler 
(1967). At the lower end of the continuum, 
the behavioural flexibility of the animals 
is limited, although they have a high 
ability to regenerate lost limbs and are able 
to exhibit adult behaviour much sooner than 
higher-order animals. Moving up the phy-
logenetic continuum, behavioural flexibility 
increases, with a decreasing ability to re-
generate lost limbs, and a longer nurturance 
period. As will be seen later, as the be-
havioural flexibility of the higher-order 
animals diversifies, physiological reduction 
may become a less appropriate strategy for 
the investigation of psychological content. 
Social Organisation and the Unit of Analy-
sis 
With animals such as termites and other 
social insects, there is a total dependence on 
the organised group as a whole, even though 
each insect is a distinct unit in the biological 
sense. Koestler (1967) claims that the social 
insects cannot be understood without refer-
ence to the hierarchical organisation which 
controls most aspects of their life. This im-
plies that the individual does not constitute 
a suitable unit of analysis for the study of 
the social insects. As Koestler (1967) puts it: 
"An individual is usually defined as an in-
divisible, self-contained unit, with a sepa-
rate, independent existence of its own. But 
individuals in this absolute sense are 
nowhere to be found in Nature or society, just 
as we nowhere find absolute wholes. Instead 
of separateness and independence, there is 
co-operation and interdependence, running 
through the whole gamut, from physical 
symbiosis to the cohesive bonds of the 
swarm, hive, shoal, flock, herd, family, so-
ciety "(p67). Thus the status of the individ-
ual as a suitable unit of analysis at any 
level is called into question by Koestler. The 
implications of this for psychology will be 
developed over the next few pages. With 
increasing levels of the phylogenetic con-
tinuum, animals exhibit increased be-
havioural flexibility and an increasing 
amount of independence from the social or-
ganisation around them Also, the increasing 
complexity of the internal organisation of 
the biological unit in this direction gives 
the scientist a lot to study without taking 
wider social or structural considerations into 
account. 
It is contended here that in the direction 
of increasing autonomy on the phylogenetic 
scale, the increasing complexity of the lev-
els of systems within the organism has led 
to the biological unit being seen as the suit-
able unit of analysis for psychology. This 
section represents an attempt to show that 
the individual as the unit of analysis in 
psychology is an arbitrary restriction in 
terms of the hierarchy of systems. This re-
striction is of course not arbitrary in terms of 
the pragmatic constraints on scientific phi-
losophy and method. According to Koestler 
(1967) the world could better be seen from a 
twin perspective: in terms of the given sub-
ject matter being a whole in itself (the indi-
vidualistic perspective) and at the same 
time part of a larger system. This recognises 
a "hierarchically organised world" that 
Koestler argues for, and represents a sort of 
"top-down" way of interpreting causal 
chains. He argues for a downward determi-
nation from higher-level trigger-like causes 
to more widely-spread phenomena at lower 
levels. Non-specific precipitants at higher 
levels are seen to control or guide the more 
widely distributed but more specialised 
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phenomena at lower levels. Koestler's ex-
ample of the analysis of speech behaviour 
illustrates the epistemology of his ap-
proach. He makes the point that speech is a 
rule-governed behaviour where the speaker 
is largely unaware of the lower-level prob-
lems (such as muscle co-ordination) that 
speech presents. Indeed, Koestler speculates 
that a reductive account of speech may well 
conclude that speech is not possible!. A sim-
plified version of the causal chain involves: 
"converting the potentialities of an idea 
into into the actual motion-patterns of the 
vocal chords"(p41). By interpreting the 
world in terms of causal hierarchies which 
act from the top-down, Koestler attempts to 
show that reductive explanations do an in-
adequate explanatory job. The twin-aspect 
view of scientific content as both a whole in 
itself and part of a larger whole leaves the 
hierarchy "open-ended", in that the top of 
the hierarchy is not defined - a sort of infi-
nite regress. 
Single Concepts in Psychology. 
Single concepts in psychology represent a 
reductionist method of describing the subject 
matter of psychology in a vastly simplified 
manner. The term "single concept" will refer 
here to the narrowing of the scope of enquiry 
to a single type of "cause" that is seen to 
explain the phenomenon in question. Single 
concepts can be an integral part of modelling 
in science (discussed in Chapter Five), 
where an unknown phenomenon is reduced to 
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a known process. 
An example of a single concept in social 
psychology is the cost-benefit analysis that 
may be applied to the development of dat-
ing relationships (Berscheid, 1985) in order 
to predict whether or not a relationship 
will continue. The single concept here is the 
rational (micro) economic model of human 
nature. Another example is the catch-all 
concept of "cognitive dissonance" (Festinger, 
1957), a theory that sees cognitions about a 
person or object as being dissonant when 
there is some sort of illogicality or incom-
patibility between them. Applications of 
this sort are prone to commit a sort of 
nominal fallacy - merely labelling a cogni-
tive state without actually explaining it. 
The state of cognitive dissonance is not well 
defined but it is relatively easy to produce. 
A final example of a single concept can be 
found in sociobiology, which is predicated 
on on the concept of genetic propagation, re-
ducing behaviour to this concept. Single con-
cepts also are convenient vehicles for post-
hoc theorising - you can only interpret 
cognitive dissonance retrospectively, as 
with reinforcement theory. Computing mod-
els can be considered a "single concept" in 
that they reduce the complexities of psy-
chology to binary logic, however this is an 
oversimplification, and computer models 
will get a more sympathetic airing in 
Chapter Five. 
The behavioural tradition in psychol-
ogy, in spite of being a within-level 
paradigm, reduces the complexities of be-
haviour to the principle of reinforcement, 
gaining little sympathy from Koestler 
(1967). Although it is not the intention here 
to echo Koestler's trenchant diatribe against 
behaviourism, two points emerge which ap-
ply to the Skinnerian behaviourism that 
also apply to the single concepts mentioned 
above. These points attempt to illustrate 
the explanatory inadequacy of single con-
cepts in psychology. 
Firstly, the obvious point is that single 
concepts do not provide the researcher with 
data that enables the complexities of ev-
eryday behaviour to be represented by aca-
demic psychology. The laboratory technique 
that follows from the demands of science, 
and use of lower-order mammals1 in some 
fields, abstract the subject matter to an ex-
tent that renders reconstruction or synthesis 
impossible. In short, the bottom-up analysis 
does not enable sufficient building-up to be 
done once the parts are separated. 
In defence of the behavioural paradigm, 
it takes as something of an epistemological 
principle that the best way to gain knowl-
edge is to break down behaviour into its con-
stituents, an effort to simplify the be-
havioural complexities. This is diametri-
cally opposed to the sort of paradigm out-
lined by Koestler which takes the 
complexities of behaviour as something to be 
preserved. Thus although the method-
ological implications arising from the two 
paradigms appear to be in conflict, the two 
1 The use of "a.nimal models" as explanatory 
vehicles in psychology is also a form of 
reductionism from higher to lower forms on 
the phylogenetic continuum. 
do not communicate with each other due to 
the disparity in epistemological outlook. 
The two outlooks differ in a fundamental 
way, therefore it would be unfair to judge 
one from the outlook of the other. 
The second point that arises in a discus-
sion of single concepts in psychology is that 
single concepts are often sourced in a lower-
level science in a bid to help simplify the 
complexities of social science. Since the bio-
logical beast is is found at the next lower 
discipline from psychology, single concepts 
in psychology that model the processes of 
the biological beast find themselves wel-
come in an individualistic ethos. 
More on Individualism 
The twin-aspect outlook outlined in the sec-
tion on a hierarchy of systems carries the 
methodological insecurities of the "global-
ist" (Harth,1982) approach, but allows the 
reductive analysis a complementary2 role in 
the explanatory picture. Barth's globalism 
refers to the collective effects of ten billion 
neurons being taken into account to avoid the 
explanatory impoverishment of the mono-
neural analysis, but the term "globalism" is 
extended here to refer to the global or wider 
societal aspects of the top-down approach, 
an approach that a natural scientist like 
the physicist Hodgson (1985) would see as 
2 A possible complementary role for 
reductive results will be developed in the 
section on "derivation-reduction" in Chapter 
Five. 
39 
dangerous due to the unfruitful directions in 
which the non-reductive pursuits lead (an 
historical outlook can present reductionism 
in a rather favourable light, but as seen in 
Chapter Three, the explanatory framework 
of reductionism may be currently overtaxed). 
As with reductive explanations, indiv-
idualist explanations may have a 
complementary role in the explanatory pic-
ture, even at an impersonal social level. 
Even if a reference to individuals is not seen 
as providing a full explanation, a strong ar-
gument can be made that a full or complete 
explanation is not possible without some 
reference to individuals (Kincaid, 1986). In-
dividualism, although implying a biologi-
cal unit, can refer to the unit of analysis in 
social psychology - the field still measures 
the biological unit and its inputs (see Chap-
ter Two and the limitations of the "open 
system" approach). The aggregate statistics 
of groups of people in social psychology, by 
being based on individual scores, appears to 
lose touch with even the meagre ben'efi ts of 
individualistic analysis without synthe-
sising higher-level knowledge, thus ap-
pearing to leave concepts such as "the false 
consensus effect" (Ross, Greene & House, 
1977) on uncertain ground. 
Individualism is a form of reductionism 
especially when referring to phenomena 
that have political/ structural implications. 
An example of an individualistic explana-
tion in a political context would be a 
psychological or aggression-based explana-
tion for international conflict. 
The negative political implications that 
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an individualist analysis provides include 
the fact that the explanation for human be-
haviour can be found by looking inside the 
organism. Issues of blame arise here, where-
in lies a paradox provided by societal-level 
organisation: blame is accorded to 
individuals in spite of the deterministic 
links sought by the scientific world, links 
which theoretically absolve actors of a 
large portion of the blame. However, the 
intention here is not to critique reductionism 
or individualism on political grounds. 
Rather, it is intended to assess the individ-
ualistic paradigm from the perspective of 
whether or not it provides an adequate ex-
planation in psychology. The reductive im-
plications of an individualistic unit of 
analysis would suggest not. 
However the main individualist question 
in psychology is whether or not the psycho-
logical animal can be understood by refer-
ence to individual factors. In the light of the 
section on the hierarchy of systems it is con-
tended that there are aspects of psychology 
that are not reducible to the measurable 
characteristics of the biological unit. For 
example, the routine behaviour of working 
people in western society may not be reduced 
to the individual characteristics of each 
person. With such trans-personal monotony 
evident across the world, an analysis of po-
litical or even business structure would con-
stitute a more fruitful line of enquiry. 
Llewelyn and Kelly (1980) point out that 
"the fact that we all talk the same lan-
guage, in itself challenges the status of our 
individuality"p(410). Does this threaten 
the status of psychology as a discipline? 
Probably not, since the reductive definition 
of psychology is set by the upper limit - i.e. 
the name "psychology" sets psychology as 
the highest content level. It is apparently, 
by this definition, permissible to reduce to 
lower-level sciences without losing a disci-
plinary identity. As long as the phenomena 
to be explained lie at the psychological 
level, then there should be no problem with 
explanations that sample a range of levels. 
Summary 
This chapter has attempted to cover a wide 
range of issues regarding the notion of levels 
of sciences and levels of systems. The sepa-
ration between the concepts of a hierarchy 
of sciences and a hierarchy of systems was 
maintained following the "realist" distinc-
tion in Chapter Three between the theor-
etical outlook of the observer, and an 
assumed worldly reality that supplies the 
content or subject ·matter of the sciences. 
The hierarchy of the sciences involves an 
ordering of the sciences according to com-
plexity looking up, or according to simplic-
ity or generality looking down. Although 
the hierarchy presented as a list running 
from physics or sub-atomic physics through 
chemistry and biology to psychology and 
sociology appears like a ladder, the systems 
that the disciplines represent can better be 
conceptualised as a sort of inverted tree, 
where the generalised "commands" at the 
top precipitate action in increasingly 
smaller units of analysis at lower levels. 
Note that the generalised higher con-
cepts "ideas"are seen here to flow down to 
specific lower concepts "motor neurons", al-
though the systems at lower levels are more 
widely distributed, and talk of the content 
of lower-level systems refers to the general-
ity or wide applicability of the lower-level 
system. The hierarchy of sciences becomes 
increasingly complex in the downward di-
rection only in the sense that increasingly 
smaller units of analysis reveal new and 
more intricate research questions, otherwise 
the term complexity is used here to the in-
creasing number of levels within higher-
level theories and systems. A downwardly 
determinative approach is endorsed here in 
contrast to the traditonal reductive route 
which can be seen as "upwardly determina-
tive" by studying parts in isolation. 
The indeterminacies of quantum level 
physics and the effects of chaos are difficult 
to ignore. These indeterminacies carry nega-
tive implications for the possibility of suc-
cessful translations between scientific lev-
els. These translation issues are discussed in 
the next chapter. The change in emphasis in 
physics from structures to energy fields can 
be seen to model for psychology a shift away 
from the search for lower-level physical 
determinants of behaviour (Llewelyn & 
Kelly, 1980). 
As the unit of analysis increases in scope 
with biological organisms higher on the 
phylogenetic continuum, the complexity of 
the internal systems that emerge provides 
the scientist with many research questions 
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to answer. It is contended here that the bio-
logical unit in psychology represents an ar-
bitrary restriction on the scope of the unit of 
analysis, and that the model of the world's 
systems as being hierarchically ordered 
from higher generalised systems to lower 
specialised levels paves the way for a twin-
aspect view (after Koestler) of the unit of 
analysis that sees a given phenomena in any 
discipline as part of a larger system, and 
also a system in itself. This view improves 
on the deficits of the "open system" ap-
proach mentioned in Chapter Two by al-
lowing the unit of analysis to transcend the 
individual if this helps the explanation. 
The globalist excesses of downward deter-
mination have been tempered by the com-
ponents of a given unit of analysis being 




Epistemological Issues in 
Reductionism 
Introduction 
This chapter will attempt to deal with re-
duction as divided into three separate cate-
gories regarding knowledge, facts and 
method. A broad definition of each of the 
three terms epistemological, ontological 
and methodological reductionism will be 
followed by a discussion of the first two 
terms. A discussion of wholes, sums and parts 
will be followed by an analysis of reductive 
models in psychology. This chapter at-
tempts to describe translation difficulties 
that prevent the lower-level disciplines on 
the hierarchy of sciences from being "built 
up" to comprise the higher-level disci-
plines. 
Epistemological Reductionism 
The word "epistemology" means "theories of 
knowledge". The substance of epistemologi-
cal discussion is an attempt to say how we 
come to know about the world. Theories of 
knowledge are seen here as an essentially 
linguistic exercise, and can be considered in 
abstraction from worldly phenomena. Re-
ductionism is epistemological in that it pos-
tulates a particular way of knowing about 
the world as being a better explanation than 
a within-level explanation. This superior 
knowledge is obtained by reference to a more 
basic knowledge - taking knowledge at one 
"level" of science and reducing it to that of a 
lower level. With reduction then, the chief 
epistemological exercise is to "explain" or 
render more intelligible data1 at one level 
with reference to a science at another level. 
The epistemological question in this chapter 
is whether or not the terms of one science can 
be translated into the terms of another sci-
ence. If this were possible to a high enough 
degree, then in theory, higher levels of sci-
ence would become redundant. Reductionist 
translations in science A that reduce to sci-
ence B work to render science A redundant, 
although the initial problems or questions 
1 Note that Chapter Three distinguishes 
data from an assumed worldly reality. 
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are couched in terms of science A. Epistemo-
logical claims include "everything can be 
reduced/ explained by mathematics" or 
"higher level sciences can be reduced to 
physics". Clark (1980) writes about three 
types of reduction; 1) Eliminative reduction; 
2) Derivation-reduction; and 3) Model-re-
duction. The first two were introduced in 
Chapter Two, and will be discussed here in 
the section on epistemological reductionism. 
Ontological Reductionism and Identity 
Theory 
The word "ontology" refers to theories of 
facts, or theories of "how the world is". An 
ontologically reductionist claim would be 
something like "phenomena at level A are 
'nothing but' phenomena at level B". The 
ontological reductionist would claim that a 
"complete knowledge" of the entities at 
lower level B are sufficient to gain a com-
plete knowledge of the entities at higher 
level A, without investigating the higher 
level entities. This is an extreme 
philosophical position that denies any 
emergent properties of higher levels of or-
ganisation, and in practice is diluted to "a 
partial knowledge of the entities at lower 
level B is sufficient to dispense with inves-
tigation at higher level A". 
There is a problem with the extreme form 
of ontological reductionism that holds that 
something like "depression" is in fact 
"biology". By saying that one discipline is 
in fact the other, the higher-level disci-
pline is rendered redundant and it becomes 
meaningless to use the terms of the higher-
level discipline. This problem is seen here to 
affect the identity theory of psychological 
states. 
Regarding identity theory, by saying 
that a sensation is the firing of a neuron, it 
is possible to interpret from this that the 
neuron is a sentient entity that knows the 
psychological nature of the task it is in-
volved in Harth (1982). This represents an 
extreme form of the faith in the reductive 
paradigm's ability to provide adequate ex-
planation. Harth refers to such reasoning as 
a category mistake, which regards talk of 
perception and talk of electrochemical pro-
cesses as mutually exclusive categories, in 
spite of the reductive implication that 
there is no difference between the two. Rose 
(1982) writes in a similar vein: " ... the inter-
pretation at each level requires concepts 
which are themselves only appropriate to 
that level... genes are not spiteful or altru-
istic, assemblages of cells cannot learn, love 
or be angry; such terms are inappropriate to 
the genie or physiological levels of analy-
sis, but appropriate to the whole organism" 
(Rose, 1982, p13). This problem with iden-
tity theory echoes a fundamental inade-
quacy of reductive analysis, being that the 
higher-level content is lost in the downward 
transgression of disciplinary barriers. For 
this reason, the identity theory of psycho-
logical states will not be examined at length 
here. 
Methodological Reductionism 
This is interpreted here as referring to the 
investigative method that follows from re-
ductionist principles. The term "method-
ological" refers to the theoretical imper-
ative that atomistic or reductive methods 
are the best means which which to study 
the world in order to provide the ex-
planation sought. This type of reductionism 
was largely the subject of Chapter Two, and 
involves the measurement and quantifica-
tion of states and processes at a level seen as 
more basic in terms of a hierarchy of sci-
ences. In general, wholes are broken down 
into parts and the parts are studied, (with 
an intention) to build up from the micro to 
the macro level (Peacocke, 1976). This con-
ceptual framework may include among its 
exponents the hard core of reductionists who 
cling to the belief that reductive difficulties 
are due solely to present incompleteness in 
technical knowledge, and believe that all 
the sciences will be reduced to physics and 
chemistry (Peacocke, 1976). 
Epistemological Issues in 
Reduction: Eliminative Reduction 
Epistemological reductionism is essentially 
a question of the ability to translate be-
tween two different sciences, usually at ad-
jacent levels in the hierarchy of sciences. 
The typical presentation of the problem 
comprises the form of a linguistic identity 
relation between two sciences. An extreme 
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form of epistemological reduction is elimi-
native-reduction (Clark,1980), where if the 
terms or sentences of one theory can be shown 
to be special cases of the terms or sentences of 
another theory at a lower level, then a suc-
cessful reduction can be said to be made. Put 
more formally (adapted from Clark, 1980): 
1) The reducing theory explains all of the 
observations explained by the reduced the-
ory T', and may explain more since the lower 
level science is more general in its applica-
tion. The reference to neural states also in-
volves a more precise account of the reduced 
phenomena. 
2) The reduced theory and the reducing 
theory employ radically different concep-
tual frameworks. Terms in each theory are 
linked to different observations, and the two 
theoretical approaches describe different 
things. 
3) Some assumptions of the reduced the-
ory are rendered false. Higher level theo-
ries are not relevant to the problem. Accord-
ing to Clark: "Theoretical terms in the1 two 
theories for this reason cannot be related to 
each other without either falsity or contra-
diction"(p26). 
4) The success of the reducing theory T 
enables us to reject the reduced theory T' and 
cease to employ its theoretical terms, with 
simple replacement of the theoretical 
framework involved. 
These points illustrate a view of reduc-
tion that sees two theoretical outlooks at 
different scientific levels as providing in-
compatible explanations of psychological or 
indeed any phenomena. The eliminative re-
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ductionism represented here demands that 
either one or the other scientific level pro-
vide an account of the phenomenon in ques-
tion, that excludes the other explanation in 
a competitive manner. Common examples of 
such eliminative reductionism include the 
statement that "depression as a theoretical 
problem involves depletion of biogenic 
amines in the sympathetic region of the 
brain", or "a knowledge of the response con-
tingencies in the external environment elim-
inates the need for explanations that in-
volve reference to private mental events". 
The former statement can be easily con-
verted to a statement of ontological reduc-
tionism by restating it thus: " depression is 
nothing but the depletion of biogenic amines 
in the brain". This subtle distinction be-
tween these two statements is made because 
scientific theory or observation, as seen in 
Chapter Three, is unable to provide 
"givens" that provide an immutable knowl-
edge-base. This leads on to the point that 
ontological claims regarding the status of a 
problem as "biological" or "psychological" 
are on dubious foundations. It would be safer, 
therefore, to couch knowledge-claims in 
terms of theory, for example one could say 
that "depression is a problem of neural 
models". This still leaves us with an anal-
ysis that might be called eliminative 
reductionism, however it is not as material 
as the ontological claim. An allowance is not 
made here for the ontological reductionists 
who say " X is nothing but Y" that immedi-
ately assumes their claims to be theoretical. 
Thus a bald ontological claim is treated 
here at face value, and disagreed with as 
such. 
Assessment 
One of the key questions in the assessment of 
the eliminative-reductive view is whether 
or not the terms of one science, theory or 
paradigm can be translated into the terms of 
a science, theory or paradigm at another 
level. Although there is an extensive 
literature on reductionism, writers in defence 
of reductionism are not easily found. 
Exceptions to this include the pro-reductive 
articles by Popper (1974) and Eccles (1974). 
A negative bias appears in articles that 
discuss reductionism; writers that find occa-
sion to discuss reductionism tend to talk 
about the feasibility of (e.g.Jessor, 1958), 
and problems with reducing the terms of one 
science to another science. This literature 
responds to (or makes explicit) aspects of 
science that are implicit in the research 
methodology available. In a sense, litera-
ture on the merits of reductive strategies is 
not needed in defence of reductionism, be-
cause the philosophy is already endorsed in 
the research strategies. Also, the topic of 
reductionism can be discussed without the 
writer using the term "reductionism" at all 
(Thorpe, 1974). Reductionism is also an im-
plicit issue on writings on consciousness, in-
dividualism in psychology and the mind-
body problem. 
The feasibility of translation between 
the two sciences does not, however, hold the 
key to the "problem of reductionism". One of 
the main objectives of this thesis is to assess 
reductionism on grounds that go beyond the 
epistemological issues of linguistic transla-
tion between sciences. Some of these grounds 
became evident in Chapter Four in the dis-
cussion on individualism in psychology. The 
translation problem from one science to an-
other will be discussed in the section on 
derivation-reduction, with the discussion 
concentrating on such things as "connecting 
principles" and "identity statements". 
Theoretical frameworks 
Reductive arguments can involve changing 
the theoretical framework, for example 
from psychology to physiology, from Aris-
totelian to Copernican astronomy, from reli-
gious to Newtonian to Relativistic physics, 
or from "indirect" to "direct" perception 
(Michaels and Carello, 1981). In each case 
the theoretical framework has changed as a 
result of the inadequacies of the old frame-
work being an obstacle to knowledge ad-
vancement. Theoretical frameworks set the 
parameters of the questions being asked 
(Chapter Three). 
The reductive explanation that elimi-
nates one level of theorising in favour of an-
other often involves replacing "common 
sense" with another explanation, usually 
with a more materialistic bias. The common 
sense explanation is seen to be redundant 
with regard to the cause of a given phe-
nomenon. Reductive analysis can also give a 
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new type of explanation, or as mentioned 
before, can present a new theoretical 
framework. The explanatory account could 
be changed by a reductive account from a de-
scriptive to an attempted causative account, 
or the change may be from one causative ac-
count to another. The reductive account en-
ables us to debunk the false correlations that 
arise in common-sense thinking, and in psy-
chology may provide the third variable 
that links two closely correlated observed 
phenomena. Elsewhere in psychology, the 
third variable is known as a problem which 
interferes with univariate manipulations 
and results in uncertainty of causal inference 
in investigations that are limited to one re-
gressive step. The two senses of the term 
"third variable" are a result of the vague-
ness of the term. 
Two differing theoretical outlooks can 
offer postulates regarding differing places in 
the causal chain. A physiological account 
differs from a psychological or behavioural 
account in that the physiological outlook 
concerns internal workings, whereas the be-
havioural outlook spans the physiological 
events. Thus the eliminative view chooses 
between causes that emanate from differing 
domains, one external to the organism, and 
the other internal. 
As noted in Chapter Three, "leaps 
ahead" in science are seen here to occur as a 
result of the conceptual frameworks being 
pushed to the limit. The different concep-
tual frameworks between the psychological 
terms and the physiological terms render, 
from an eliminative perspective, each 
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framework mutually exclusive. This is a 
situation where the reductive insight can 
change the nature of the explanatory 
framework. Clark (1980) sees psychological 
and physiological accounts to be not merely 
rival theories, but instances of different 
theoretical frameworks. Thus Clark sees a 
reductive explanation as providing an ex-
planation that stretches the old theoretical 
framework to the limit. This is in contrast to 
the view taken here in Chapter Three 
which sees reductive explanations as per-
petuating a particular conceptual frame-
work, i.e. reductive epistemology. Whilst 
scientific reduction has helped to change 
some. medieval conceptions of the world, re-
ductive arguments form a conceptual frame-
work in themselves that may, in this latter 
part of the twentieth century, need to be re-
placed, as the reductive framework fails to 
cope with the data emerging from a multi-
level world. 
Elimination and Replacement 
The elimination of psychological-level ex-
planations with the use of physiological-
level explanations involves a replacement 
assumption (Clark,1980) that says: "If a 
theory T' reduces to a theory T, then any ex-
planation using a term from T' can be re-
placed by some explanation using a term or 
terms from T"(p24). 
This replacement assumption underlies 
an extreme reductive position, and involves 
the use of sentences as explanations. It as-
sumes that physiological terms can replace 
psychological terms, and although psycho-
logical or common-sense terms can still be 
used, they can be dispensed with very easily 
(Rorty, 1970). 
Clark (1980) argues for the ineliminabil-
ity of psychological terms. According to 
Clark, a close set of identity statements, 
with strict localisation of function facili-
tates a fairly complete reduction. However 
Clark claims that the psychological expla-
nations are important to keep because the 
descriptive and explanatory contexts are 
different. The value judgement that emerges 
from this is that the psychological account 
with its different descriptive and explana-
tory contexts has some value over and above 
simply being distinctive. This value that 
the psychological contexts have over phys-
iological or lower-level contexts constitute 
barriers to eliminative-reduction: 
1) The purely physiological description 
does not make clear the connection between 
the physical process and the behaviour in 
question. 
2) The meaning of a given psychological 
term is that the psychological state has 
certain relations to stimulus variables, to 
other variables, and to response variables. 
We need functional terms to determine the 
relations between the stimulus conditions, 
internal states and behaviour. 
For Clark, then, functional terms hold 
the key to relating psychological terms to 
physiological terms in a manner that ren-
ders reduction successful. 
Derivation-reduction 
This position treats reduction as a deriva-
tion of one science or level of theory from 
another. The factual statements in physical 
terms from a derivation-reduction point of 
view are complementary to the factual 
statements in the higher-level science. In 
this derivative sense, physiological infor-
mation can "back up" the observations made 
in psychology. This can be done in at least 
two ways. Firstly, the physiological find-
ings can confirm the psychological state-
ments by the observed action of neural or 
other physiological structures that are al-
ready implicated in the given behaviour. 
The confirmation of activation of a structure 
known to be involved in a given psychologi-
cal process may be useful in a diagnostic 
sense. A second way that a lower-level sci-
ence can complement a higher-level science 
is through the discovery or explication of 
structures at a lower level that are seen to be 
involved with the higher-level process. 
The derivation of a lower-level science from 
a higher-level science involves the assump-
tion that some sort of general identities ex-
ist. These general identities connect a state 
represented by science A to a state repre-
sented by science B. For example, depression 
in psychology may be represented as a de-
pletion of brain NE in certain areas of the 
brain. The logical derivation from a higher-
level science to a lower-level science in-
volves the use of "connecting principles" 
which, according to Clark (1980) are general 
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identities. The general identities act as con-
necting principles. 
General Identities and Connecting Principles 
A general identity is a type of statement 
that links two classes (Clark,1980) of the-
ory, and the establishment of general iden-
tities are seen by Clark as being important 
for the derivation-reduction view, in that 
they should enable some communication be-
tween the two levels of theory. 
The connecting principles that enable re-
duction between two scientific languages in-
volve necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the derivation to succeed. Clark (1980) 
states that the best forms of connecting prin-
ciple that we have at the moment are of the 
type "The ventromedial hypothalamus is 
the satiety centre". This statement connects 
the physiological term "ventromedial hy-
pothalamus" to the psychological term 
"satiety". Thus according to Clark, the best 
statement of a general identity we have is 
one of localisation of function, (Chapter 
Two) which connects the higher-level psy-
chological terms to the lower-level physio-
logical terms. Localising a concept such as 
"satiety" to the area of the "ventromedial 
hypothalamus" enables the psychological 
function to be assigned to the physiological 
apparatus or state. 
In Clark's analysis, there is an implicit 
assumption that in statements like "The 
ventromedial hypothalamus is the satiety 
centre" one takes the ontological statement 
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(of fact) and gives it epistemological status. 
The best way of knowing about the world is 
through reduction to a lower level science, 
according to epistemological reductionism. 
Since Clark treats reduction as a linguistic 
(or epistemological) exercise, the claim that 
the ventromedial hypothalamus is the 
satiety centre presents an ontological rather 
than an epistemological or linguistic view. 
The problem seen here is that there is no 
cognisance of a distinction between theories 
of facts and theories of knowledge. The 
Clark material appears to take reduction as 
a methodology (localising function) and 
mistake it for reduction as an epistemology, 
whereas this thesis has represented an at-
tempt to keep the two uses separate. The 
literature on reductionism often does not 
make clear distinctions between the many 
different senses of the term "reductionism". 
Some Problems of Epistemology. 
The most obvious, and best documented epis-
temological problem lies in the translation 
problem between two levels of scientific 
discourse. Supposing that localisation of 
function were possible to a high degree, and 
that higher-level theoretical content could 
be assigned to the lower-level states. Ques-
tions emerge as to what it means to assign 
psychological content to a physiological 
state, and also whether or not it is impor-
tant to retain meaning or functional signifi-
cance in a reductive explanation. 
When reducing a psychological phe-
nomenon or concept to a physiological state 
for explanatory purposes, the meaning of the 
terms used undergoes some change. For ex-
ample, in the Jessor (1958) arm-waving ex-
ample, an explication of physiological 
events involved with arm-waving leaves 
out the functional significance of the psy-
chological act. This inability of one science 
to be adequately derived from the other is 
an essential feature of the anti-reductionist 
argument. 
Jessor (1958) argues that a discipline such 
as physiology lacks the contextual terms 
that lead to the development of laws in 
psychology that refer to " .. interactions be-
tween organisms and functionally defined 
environments ... "(p174). Jessor refers to red-
uctionism as a problem of logical equiv-
alence between two different levels of sci-
ence: "The barriers (to reductionism) reside 
in the absence of terms in the "lower" disci-
pline which would enable the logical 
derivability of descriptions of the func-
tional context of behaviour and, thereby, 
the derivation of the laws of psychol-
ogy."(p175). 
Gaito (1960) considers Jessor's argument to 
be lacking on the grounds that Jessor did not 
distinguish between explanation and 
description. Gaito claims that reductionism 
makes for poor description but good ex-
planation. The logical barriers to perfect 
reduction are recognised by Gaito, although 
he contends that reductive analysis is ideal 
for explanatory purposes, which he sees as 
involving seeking out the "atoms" of be-
haviour. Consequently, it is obvious that 
Gaito's (impoverished) view of explanation 
as an atomistic pursuit renders the reductive 
paradigm acceptable. 
The Logic of Reduction, Systems, and the 
Part-Whole Distinction 
When there is talk of "the logic of red uc-
tion" or "the logic of functional iso-
morphism", or when reduction is treated as a 
linguistic problem of translation between 
sciences , it is contended here that this ap-
proach misrepresents the problem of reduc-
tion to a certain extent by omitting to men-
tion the methodological manifestations of 
reductionist epistemology. Beckner (1974) 
called for a similar distinction between: 
" ... (a) the logical relations that hold be-
tween theories, descriptions, conceptual 
schemes and other instances of language; and 
(b) what we may as well call real relations 
(causal, identity, spatial, temporal, part-
whole etc) between the events and other 
phenomena that our languages de-
scribe. "(p174). 
This sort of reasoning has developed 
quite independently of the actual feasibil-
ity of the logical relations between two lev-
els of theory or science. Beckner (1974) con-
tends that if the the strongest possible for-
mulation of the reductionist thesis were 
true, then researchers would not automati-
cally study only the lower-level sciences, 
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due to the directions and hints that flow 
down from higher-level theories. Con-
versely, a recognition of any ultimate irre-
ducibility of terms from one theory to an-
other need not exclude the possibility that a 
reductive analysis is appropriate. Since 
Beckner (1974) points out that a reductive 
analysis benefits a science through the di-
rections, hints etc that flow down from the 
higher-level theories, the higher-level 
theories can provide the sort of complemen-
tary information that Clark (1980) describes 
in the definition of derivation-reduction 
outlined earlier in this chapter. Beckner's 
flow-down view of reduction can also pro-
vide the sort of higher-level context that is 
required by the Jessor (1958) critique of re-
ductionist explanation in psychology. By 
treating reduction as a derivational rather 
than an eliminative exercise, the reductive 
analysis emerges in a more constructive 
light. This highlights a theme in Chapter 
Three, that the suitability of a given ana-
lytic paradigm (and therefore method) de-
pends on certain theoretical attitudes that 
are held before the data collection com-
mences. After Beckner, the reductive analy-
sis appears to have more to contribute if the 
information yielded is simply considered as 
complementary rather than exclusionary. 
This concurs with the common-sense view 
that different sources of data (from different 
levels) can provide a more complete picture 
of the target phenomenon. 
Campbell (1974) uses the term 
"downward causation", to describe, how in 
biology the laws of the higher-level world 
52 
(e.g. natural selection) determine the 
distribution of lower-level events and sub-
stances. Causation is seen by Campbell as 
running downward only if the temporal unit 
of analysis is large enough to span several 
reproductive generations. Such direction is 
lacking in the instantaneous causal analyses 
derived from (older) physics (Campbell, 
1974). This change in the size of the unit of 
analysis from instantaneous to longer term 
moves in the direction of the Gibson (1979) 
conception of time as being relative to 
events. Gibson sees the reality underlying 
the dimension of time as events, not time as 
as the underlying constant behind events. By 
taking instantaneous snap-shot measures, 
the reductionist obscures the higher-level 
context of the target phenomenon, and 
leaves structure and function as salient units 
of analysis. 
Gibson (1979), referring to ecological 
events, claims that there exist regularities 
at the higher-level that cannot be encom-
passed by the laws of mechanics and 
physics. The elicitation of higher-level 
laws is significant for such writers as Gibson, 
Koestler, Beckner and Campbell. Given that 
higher-level laws are available through an 
expansion of the temporal unit of analysis, 
these writers see some value in making such 
laws reasonable goals of scientific enquiry. 
A distinction was made earlier (from 
Beckner 1974) between logical relations 
(between theories) and so-called "real rela-
tions" between events. This distinction is 
also recognised by Peacocke (1976) who 
made a distinction between a hierarchy of 
natural systems and a hierarchy of natural 
sciences. This distinction recognises a 
difference between the events and things of 
the world, and the tools available to inves-
tigate the world, i.e. theory. Systems are 
taken in this analysis as being ass urned to 
exist independently of the theoretical out-
look imposed by observation. Peacocke sees 
theory-reduction as an essentially linguistic 
exercise and not " ... the derivation of the 
properties of one subject matter from the 
properties of another - because the 'nature' 
of things (especially the elementary con-
stituents of things) is not accessible to direct 
inspection" (Peacocke, 1976, p320). 
Autonomy of Higher-Level Theories and 
Systems 
"Autonomy" is a concept that attempts to 
describe the non-reducibility of higher-
level theories or systems. A higher-level 
system or process Sh is seen as autonomous 
from a lower-level System or process S1 if 
the parts that make up S1 are not sufficient 
to also compose the parts that make up Sh, 
Conversely, a higher-level theory Th is au-
tonomous with respect to a lower-level the-
ory T1 if the terms of the Th are not re-
ducible to the terms of T1. This latter prob-
lem is the chief epistemological problem of 
the present chapter. 
The autonomy of higher-level theories or 
systems is a concept that bears some resem-
blance to three other terms found in biologi-
cal writing. "Emergence" is a term that de-
scribes the properties that appear as the 
hierarchy of sciences is ascended. For exam-
ple, in chemistry, sodium and chlorine both 
have poisonous properties whereas their 
synthesis results in the non-poisonous sub-
stance salt. In psychology, the psychologi-
cal or social context is usually unable to be 
encoded in physiological terms. The second 
term, "vitalism" is a term that refers to a 
non-physical control mechanism such as the 
mind that has been seen to play some causal 
part in the behaviour of biological organ-
isms. This non-physical entity, a legacy of 
Descartes, represents an emergent property 
of the biological unit. The third emergence-
related term to be mentioned here is "organic 
unity", which refers to the unit of analysis 
as being not reducible to the sum of its parts. 
When distinguishing between hierar-
chies of systems and hierarchies of theories, 
Beckner (1974) makes a distinction between 
"process" autonomy and "theory" autonomy. 
By making the distinction between hierar-
chies of systems and hierarchies of theories, 
Beckner shows that the autonomy of higher-
level processes does not follow from theory 
autonomy, because theory irreducibility 
may be due to differences in the conceptual 
structure of the two theories, and not to lack 
any of determination of processes in levels of 
systems (Peacocke,1976). Thus the inability 
of the scientific world to penetrate the sys-
tems of the antic world is a salient issue 
again. Beckner (1974) considers it a fallacy 
to think that if a phenomenon P at level i 
(Pj) is exhaustively composed of parts Pi-1, 
then any theory Tj is must be reducible to 
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Ti-1 · He sees this fallacy as being one that 
"has consistently been opposed by the or-
ganicist and vitalist traditions"p168. 
This distinction between hierarchies of 
systems and hierarchies of theories enables 
one to gain some insight into the special 
character of hierarchies of theories. How-
ever, this distinction does carry with it a 
certain problem. Although it refers to a di-
chotomy between process and theory, the act 
of writing about it renders both process and 
theory as linguistic phenomena. There is a 
certain irony in making such a distinction, 
due to the necessity to use language to report 
it. Scientific enquiry binds systems with 
theories by reducing sys terns to the 
theoretical level. Although this thesis is 
not considered to be a piece of scientific en-
quiry, the linguistic, theoretical mode of 
talking about the world constrains this the-
sis as it would any other piece of academic 
enquiry. 
Model-Reduction. 
The term "model" has many different senses 
in academic as well as popular use, and a 
common use of models in psychology is in 
Barre's (1970) sense of the word "para-
morphic". Although Harre provides a 
comprehensive taxonomy of models in sci-
ence (including homeomorphic, iconic and 
sentential models), the paramorphic model 
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is selected here due to its reductive 
popularity in psychology. A paramorphic 
model is one which describes some hypo-
thetical mechanism or system which helps 
to explain in a particular way the target 
phenomenon as if it were like the source of 
the model. Paramorphic models work 
through analogy. In the research context in 
psychology the model represents some sys-
tem or phenomenon that is well understood, 
and is used by analogy to explain the target 
phenomenon 
With paramorphic modelling, the struc-
ture of the model is not claimed to be the 
same as that of the mechanism being mod-
eled, and the form or process is also not 
claimed to be same - hence the "as-if" clause 
that relates process by analogy. An example 
is the Lorenz action-specific energy model, 
which models the nervous system on a fluid 
reserve (supplied by a tap) which accumu-
lates to represent the available (action-
specific) energy of an organism at any given 
moment. External stimulation combines with 
internal pressure to result in the release of 
this energy in behaviour through the 
releasing mechanism (Clark, 1980). Be-
haviour is not claimed by this model to be 
mediated by a liquid reservoir filling up to 
overflow point. Thus neither structure 
(hydraulic mechanism) nor process 
(overflow) are meant to be literal postula-
tions. 
Some overflow of a certain type of energy 
is postulated, but it is not the same as over-
flowing water, merely analogous to the un-
derlying mechanism - hence the term "para" 
which indicates the form to be different. 
Reduction through Modelling. 
With paramorphic models, the unknown 
"subject" is a mechanism or system that is 
somehow hidden or not observable. It is the 
role of the model to represent the subject, 
and this is done by reference or analogy to a 
process that is known. The known process or 
system can be called the "source", from 
which the inferences about the subject are 
derived. The essence of modelling lies in the 
application of source-knowledge to the sub-
ject in order to better understand not the 
structure but the dynamic aspects of the sub-
ject. There is an emphasis on process and 
function with an attempt to gain some sort of 
functional isomorphism (Clark,1980) be-
tween source and subject. 
Models in the paramorphic form, by tak-
ing a known process or system and applying 
it to the unknown subject are reducing the 
unknown to the known. This takes science 
ahead by small conservative steps, and as 
seen in Chapter Three, eventually stretches 
a theoretical framework to the limit of ex-
planatory usefulness by virtue of the 
(reductive) method being less and less able 
to cope with anomalous observations. The 
small conservative steps that model-reduc-
tion encourages are consistent with Manicas 
and Secord's (1983) standard view of science 
outlined in Chapter Three. 
Models in the sense outlined above are 
essentially reductive tools. If the reductive 
paradigm involves a search for hidden gen-
erative mechanisms, then models provide an 
ideal tool for this approach. Thus far, the 
analysis has been no more specific than to 
state that the "unknown" is reduced to the 
"known". Clark (1980) is somewhat more 
specific, saying that reduction is a matter of 
finding a model in one discipline for a the-
ory in another discipline. Thus Clark claims 
that models cross disciplinary boundaries. 
The reductive implications of the re-
course to models mean that explanations for 
phenomena in the psychological domain are 
readily sought in the biological domain, 
which was seen in Chapter Four as the level 
immediately below psychology in the hier-
archy of the sciences. Models, it is contended 
here, may have become popular in psychol-
ogy due to the extent to which they facili-
tate reduction to disciplines that are seen in 
some sense as simpler than psychology. In 
"black box" modelling, the internal physio-
logical apparatus is not represented as such. 
Some other field or discipline provides the 
model. This is contrasted with the purely 
reductive matter of translation problems be-
tween sciences. This translation does not in-
volve modelling because of the attempt to 
establish true identities between the two 
sciences. Consequently, this thesis does not 
deal with terms like "a physiological 
model" of a psychological phenomenon. This 
use of the term "model" is seen as somewhat 
redundant if the explanation involves pure 
reduction from one level to the next. In this 
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case, the term "theory" may be more appro-
priate. 
Models may not necessarily be reductive 
in the sense of lower levels of sciences unless 
the subject is reduced to a known source. If 
the model happens to be sourced outside the 
current theoretical framework, such as with 
relativity theory, then the reductive im-
plications may not apply. 
The following section will provide an 
example of a modelling technique in psy-
chology based on computing. A last point to 
make before this relates modelling to the 
single concepts discussed in Chapter Four, 
regards the direction of the reductive route 
in terms of levels of sciences. To place hu-
manities and natural sciences on the same 
continuum seems somewhat inappropriate, 
and finding criteria by which to order them 
could force a contrived criterion. Perhaps 
some sort of parallel hierarchy would be 
more suitable. Anyway, when modelling 
psychological processes on such disciplines 
as micro-economics, mechanics or linguistics, 
the direction of the source in relation to 
psychology is unclear. This would appear 
bring into question the status of the 
explanation as reductive. Thus it is possible 
to consider the modelling relationship to be 
reductive if the source discipline provides a 
"single concept" such as with the reduction 
of psychology to the cost-benefit analysis 
derived from economics. Consequently the 
modelling relationship can be considered 
reductive even if the model is taken from a 
higher-level discipline. This can be known 
as "reduction upwards" (Lagersptez, 1984). 
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An Example: Computer Models in 
Psychology 
Computer Models in psychology provide a 
good example of an application of para-
morphic modelling. The subject consists of a 
hypothetical generative mechanism that 
lies within the biological unit. The phe-
nomenon to be explained lies in the psycho-
logical domain, for example thought pro-
cesses, memory recall, encoding, or for-
getting. The source of the model comes from 
the computing field and can consist of some 
sort of processing hardware that accepts 
inputs and produces outputs in the same way 
that the psychological animal is seen to do, 
through an analogous process. Thus we are 
dealing with three disciplines: 1) psychol-
ogy; 2) physiology (the field that mediates 
the inputs and outputs of the psychological 
o;r target level) and 3) computing, the disci-
pline that provides the model that at-
tempts to demonstrate some sort of functional 
isomorphism between computing and 
physiology. 
Such a computer model can be thought of 
as being reductive in two ways. Firstly, it is 
reductive simply through being a more 
known quantity than the physiological 
workings of the biological unit, reducing to a 
supposedly more basic discipline. The second 
way that computer models can be thought of 
as reductive lies in the structure of the 
hardware that produces the outputs. 
There are certain similarities between 
the structure of the nervous system and the 
structure of the computer. With the nervous 
system, a common unit of analysis seems to be 
the all-or-none response of the neuron, as 
seen in Chapter Two. Although this has be-
come an inaccurate representation due to the 
discovery of graded neural responses 
(requiring a more qualitative analysis) the 
absolute measure has made a convenient unit 
of analysis. The relation that this all-or-
none response has to computing is that the 
binary logic of the on-off electronic response 
is very similar. Thus the complexities of the 
computer are reduced to binary logic. Simi-
larly, the complexities of the nervous sys-
tem are reduced to the binary logic of the 
neuron. 
This binary or functional similarity be-
tween neurons and computers has led to com-
puters providing models of the nervous sys-
tem. The reductionist problems such as 
translation difficulties and lack of a 
higher-level context appear to apply to the 
binary logic of the computer. As with the 
neuron, there is a problem of how the binary 
logic can represent the psychological phe-
nomenon at the input-output level. 
There are of course differences between 
the "pulse logic" of computing and the all-
or-none response of the neuron, mainly that 
the neuron is far more complex than this, 
with graded thresholds, graded responses 
and thousands of inputs. The logic of the 
"impoverished neuron" (Harth,1982) thus 
arbitrarily ignores the legitimate electro-
chemical processes that underly the firing of 
the neuron. 
However if it is accepted for argument's 
sake that the neural firing is a simple all-
or-none process, and that we have a reason-
able computer model of some psychological 
phenomenon, do the reductive problems that 
plague the physiological reductionist also 
render the computer model inadequate due to 
the inadequacy of pulse logic to represent 
higher processes? 
The analogy between neurophysiology 
and computing may throw some light on this 
question. Toward the end of Chapter Two 
the physiological discussion moved from the 
basic neuron to localisation of function. In 
the light of Chapter Four it can be seen that 
the subject matter in this case moves up a 
level of organisation, where the attribution 
of function differentiated different clusters 
of neurons. At this level (talking in millions 
of neurons) the quality of unique function 
emerges over the structural monotony of the 
basic neuron. Yet more properties emerge 
(balance of forces, feedback loops etc) as the 
analysis encompasses more and more of the 
brain structure as a whole. 
Likewise, the binary logic of the com-
puter should not reasonably be expected to 
carry the burden of psychological identity or 
representation. This writer's minimal 
understanding of computing processes is that 
there are several levels of organisation 
within a computer known as languages, 
which start from the bottom at the binary 
level (machine language), progress through 
assembly language, and further through to 
high-level languages, the highest of which 
communicates with the human operator, 
possibly in the natural language (e.g. en-
glish) of the operator. 
Although the higher levels of computing 
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language may or may not be reducible to in-
creasingly lower levels of organisation, the 
output level language communicates with 
the user in a form that is sophisticated 
enough to render the binary translation psy-
chologically meaningless. It would appear 
that when reducing computing to binary 
logic in order to claim that computer models 
are psychologically impoverished, the 
critic falls victim to their own tendency to be 
reductionist. 
Binary logic alone, it is contended, is not 
enough to render computer models of 
psychological processes useless. Instead, if 
one wishes to evaluate paramorphic com-
puter models in psychology, a more appro-
priate question might enquire as to whether 
the emergent properties of the two 
theoretical entities psychology and com-
puting converge at increasingly higher lev-
els of organisation. This discussion closes 
with an if-then proposition: If the proper-
ties of the two fields do converge at higher 
levels of organisation, then computing mod-
els may, by modelling the hierarchical or-
ganisation of the brain, have much to con-
tribute to the field of psychology. 
Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to attempt 
to tackle the questions of linguistic transla-
tion between different levels of theory. 
Theories are taken in abstraction from the 
systems of the world, following the litera-
ture on reductionism that considers transla-
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tional issues to be the full extent of the 
problem of reductionism. 
Eliminative-reduction represents an at-
tempt to eliminate the higher-level expla-
nation in favour of a lower-level explana-
tion, and is an extreme version of the reduc-
tionist thesis. The new explanatory frame-
work consists of the the theoretical restric-
tions of the lower-level science. In psychoi-
ogy, the localisation of function first men-
tioned in Chapter Two represents the gen-
eral identities that link the psychological 
terms to the physiological terms. 
The success or failure of reduction de-
pends, from this perspective, on the degree 
of rigour demanded of the connecting princi-
ples. Even with rigorous connecting princi-
ples or identities, however, the eliminative 
perspective is difficult to maintain due to 
the absence of higher-level terms that pro-
vide psychological significance in the ex-
planation. The derivational view carries 
more credibility by presenting less stringent 
demands on the reductive epistemology - the 
reductive information yielded serves to 
complement the knowledge at higher levels 
of knowledge. 
The extent to which a theory at a lower 
level can be derived from a theory at a 
higher determines the success of reduction 
from the derivational perspective. The 
epistemological problems of translation be-
tween one level of theory and the next re-
main, however, but do not threaten the sta-
tus of reductionism as they would for the 
eliminative perspective - if the psycho-
logical terms are there to stay, then the 
connection between these terms and the 
physiological terms do not need to be as 
strong as if elimination of psychological 
terms were the objective. The emphasis may 
shift, then, from eliminating the psy-
chological terms in the eliminative view to 
assessing the value of the physiological 
terms in the derivational view. 
Finally, model-reduction is presented 
here as an epistemological tool that relates 
theories in one discipline to models in a 
lower-level discipline. Models are discussed 
here in the context of being a reductive tool 
that facilitates enquiry about hidden 
generative mechanisms by modelling the 
unknown process on a known source derived 
from a lower-level discipline. 
CHAPTER SIX 
Conclusion 
The issue of reductionism in psychology is 
one which traditionally examines the 
feasibility of reducing one science to a lower-
level science in order to ground a scientific 
explanation in a realm that is seen as more 
basic or more real in terms of a hierarchy of 
sciences. Until the latter part of the 
twentieth century, a science such as physics 
or chemistry had a better grasp on reality 
due to being seen as more fundamental, 
general, simple and more widely applicable 
than the higher-level sciences. 
The zeitgeist of post-Newtonian science 
encouraged a way of looking at the world 
that sought explanation in the material 
world, transferring much of the causal con-
trol of worldly phenomena away from 
deities and celestial powers and into the the 
same material world as the phenomena. The 
traditional reductive route in psychology 
has been to the next lower science on the hi-
erarchy, physiology. Physiological ex-
planations for psychological phenomena are 
sought by investigation of the biological 
unit, through measurement and manipula-
tion of the physiology. This thesis has con-
centrated on neurophysiology as the reduc-
tive application in psychology, following 
the popular notion that it at least mediates 
many psychological phenomena, although 
reductionism in psychology can involve any 
bodily structure or process in a psychological 
explanation. 
Although the reduction to physiology in 
psychology is predicated on an assertion of 
general identity between psychological and 
physiological states, Chapter Two concen-
trated on the content of the lower-level in-
vestigations rather than with the identity 
relation. The basic unit of analysis in 
Chapter Two was the singular neuron and its 
all-or-none action, an action that has 
helped researchers to isolate specific areas 
with regard to psychological processes and 
enable function to be attributed to the phys-
iological apparatus. This, (as was seen 
towards the end of Chapter Five) is a 
somewhat simplistic notion of neurons, as 
they can have thousands of inputs, graded 
thresholds and graded responses. This 
leaves the basic binary action of the neuron 
as an increasingly arbitrary unit of analysis 
with regard to explanation. The convenience 
of this unit of analysis may not be able to 
continue to drown out the anomalous 
questions arising of an atomistic nature, such 
as can the "impoverished neuron" provide a 
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good model of psychological phenomena 
without recourse to yet more minute entities 
that make up the structure of the neuron? 
This is an example of the regressive trap 
that reductive researchers fall into. 
This sort of regress is constantly ready to 
trap the researcher who employs reduction-
ist methods that investigate the target 
level. The convention that arises in many 
sciences is to regress one level to the next 
lower discipline, but since this discipline is 
apparently composed of even smaller com-
ponent disciplines, the regress is too much 
for the researcher to continue with, probably 
through having been trained in only one 
discipline. Consequently the regression is 
halted at (as with the neuron example 
above) an arbitrary level with regard to 
explanation and the atomistic philosophy 
of the reductionist. 
The global approach which measures 
gross levels of brain structure can be seen as 
an arbitrary attempt to avoid ever decreas-
ing indeterminacies within the brain, and 
also to a relative extent is an approach that 
avoids the problem of the measuring 
equipment interfering with the process of 
brain activity, a problem which increases as 
the size of the unit of analysis gets smaller. 
Also, the example of the observer being part 
of the subject matter (i.e. a psychological 
being) presents a reflexive problem which 
was beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Chapter Three examined the concept of 
explanation in psychology, and considered 
the explication of causal relations to be a 
key objective of the explanatory search in 
psychology. Theory is represented as the 
vehicle though which causal explanation is 
sought, following a realist approach that 
sees all knowledge as theoretical, but also 
assumes the existence of a real world. 
Chapter Three also provided an attempt to 
represent causation as description. This 
links explanation with description in the 
reductive mode, as an account of physio-
logical determinants constitutes an expla-
nation in reductionist circles. The biological 
organism is seen to mediate cause and effect, 
leading to explanation constituting a 
descriptive, reductive account. Reductionism 
is also interpreted as a kind of theoretical 
framework that sets the parameters of 
enquiry and ignores anomalous results 
through a faith in technology. 
Chapter Three provided some points 
that tempered the discussion on reduction-
ism that followed. These included: 
1) Must an explanation for everything be 
sought? 
2) Given that the realist distinguishes be-
tween theories and an assumed ontological 
(worldly) reality, how does the unavoid-
ably theoretical outlook enable the realist 
to know about the worldly reality, apart 
from the fact that we have theory as its 
representative? 
3) The partial causation account of causality 
points out that the definition of a cause is 
restricted to controllable factors. The 
smaller the unit of analysis, the more con-
trollable are the factors. 
4) The reductive framework sets parameters 
on the unit of analysis that help perpetuate 
the framework. 
An analysis of levels of science continued the 
theme of explanation in science and explored 
the different levels of science from which a 
causal explanation can be sought. This was 
done by way of a discussion of levels of 
science, and the hierarchy of sciences was 
introduced as a list running from lower-level 
sciences such as physics and sub-atomic 
physics through to psychology and sociol-
ogy. From top to bottom, this hierarchy of 
sciences lists disciplines of increasing 
generality and applicability as the unit of 
analysis gets smaller. The lower-level sci-
ences are seen here to comprise at least part 
of the subject matter of the higher-level 
sciences. The reductive tradition holds that 
the lower levels can in fact be built up to 
comprise the higher levels of science. Two 
points are salient here: 
1) The reductive tradition goes some way to 
actually dissolving interdisciplinary bar-
riers. 
2) Indeterminacies starting at the sub-
atomic level may be amplified with in-
creasing levels of the hierarchy. 
A discussion of three directions for the 
explanation to be sourced then followed: 
top-down explanations explain with refer-
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ence to higher-level sciences - in psychology 
this tends to lose touch with the individual 
and possibly deny the agency that some 
would see as important to retain in an 
explanation. Also, top-down explanations 
do not provide causes which are controllable 
- blaming for example the structure of 
society for deviant behaviour leads to few 
manipulable variables being presented, and 
such an explanation does not cohere with an 
individualistic legal system. This echoes 
the partial causality account of "causes" 
being restricted to controllable levels for 
pragmatic reasons. 
Within-level explanations or causal 
sources carry a certain explanatory simplic-
ity that does not require arbitrary restric-
tions on the size of the unit of analysis, a 
unit which becomes ever smaller at each 
level of science. They also help to retain the 
identity of a given discipline by keeping to 
the home terminology. 
Bottom-up explanations are covered in 
detail throughout this thesis, and constitute 
the essence of reductionism. Reduction in 
psychology can also occur with recourse to 
disciplines that are not ordered in such a 
linear hierarchic fashion as with psychol-
ogy and physiology. The use of models in 
psychology (Chapter Five) can use dis-
ciplines such as micro-economics, linguistics, 
computing or mechanics to provide source-
knowledge and reduce psychology to them. 
The direction of the reduction (upwards, 
downwards or sideways) is then in some 
doubt if psychology and the model-source 
discipline are not able to be hierarchically 
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ordered. A "single concept" is considered 
here to be reductive regardless of the level 
of complexity of the source discipline. 
A hierarchy of systems was introduced in 
Chapter Four to refer to the worldly systems 
and processes that the hierarchy of sciences 
theorise about. The hierarchy of systems is 
represented here by an inverted tree, in 
which the generalised higher systems act 
downwards as precursors of more highly 
specialised but more widely distributed ac-
tivity in lower-level systems. The hierar-
chy of systems, from Koestler (1967) applied 
to psychological material helps to elucidate 
levels of systems within the psychological 
beast, and points to flow-down effects that 
start with such things as ideation and end 
with such things as low-level motor 
behaviour. The point is that the generalised 
"commands" at the top of the hierarchy 
trigger or control more specialised systems at 
lower levels without having to represent 
the detail of the lower-order systems. This 
concurs with the "downward causation" 
approach mentioned in Chapter Five, 
which sees the higher-level world as 
determining the distribution of the lower-
level events and substances. This sort of 
downward determination appears diamet-
rically opposed to reductionist determi-
nation which could be re-termed "upward 
determination". 
The analytic outlook endorsed here is a 
twin-aspect perspective that sees a given 
unit of analysis as both a whole in itself and 
also part of a larger system. The reductive 
information gleaned from lower level 
systems by lower-level sciences can con-
tribute, as seen in Chapter Five, to a 
derivational view of reduction that seeks to 
localise function or involve physiology in a 
psychological explanation. By setting 
stringent requirements for the relation of 
physiological to psychological terms, the 
analysis does not stray too far from what 
reductionists would call the underlying 
physiological realities. 
The eliminative view of reduction which 
attempts to replace psychological explana-
tions with physiological explanations is not 
taken here as plausible due to the inability 
of the psychological terms to translate 
between sciences and keep their meaning and 
higher-level context. Another reason for 
rejection of the eliminative view is a 
reluctance to change disciplines - following 
a rejection of the increased ontological status 
of lower level disciplines in the light of the 
indeterminacies outlined in Chapter Four. 
Individualism and reductionism are two 
closely related terms, since individualism 
can be considered a form of reductionism. In 
sociology, individualism is the reductionist 
problem, since individualistic psychology is 
the next lower discipline on the hierarchy. 
In psychology however, individualism is 
widely accepted as non-reductive by those 
who see the biological unit and its inputs as 
providing all the potential information for 
good explanation. It is contended here 
however, that the individualistic outlook 
fails to account for transpersonal and 
intergroup behavioural monotony, and thus 
lacks the explanatory power to account for 
social phenomena that are seen as important 
to psychology. 
Incidentally, the non-individualistic 
outlook endorsed in this thesis has seen re-
ductionism as a "social force" that is not re-
ducible to the attitudinal states of the sci-
entists who practice it. Although mention is 
made of the "reductionist" researcher, it is 
not the intention to attribute blame for the 
reductive paradigm to the reductive scien-
tist. Reductionism is seen here as a per-
vasive force in society that transcends the 
individualist paradigm, and could require 
sociological, economic or political analysis 
to be fully understood. 
The distinction between systems and 
theories implied in Chapter Three in a re-
alist context and introduced formally in 
Chapter Four was extended in Chapter Five 
to register a distinction between "process" 
and "theory" autonomy. The distinction 
attempts to show that the autonomy or 
irreducibility of higher-level processes does 
not follow from the fact that theories may 
not be reducible - due to differences in the 
conceptual structure of theories. This retains 
a faith in the fact that the world may still 
be ordered in a reductionistic, upwardly 
determinative fashion. Thus the inability 
of theory to penetrate the systems of the 
world means that we cannot eliminate the 
possibility that the levels of systems in the 
world are determined as per the reductive 
paradigm. 
With this qualification in mind, the 
twin perspective outlined here firstly 
avoids to a certain extent the globalist ex-
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cesses of a top-down approach that loses 
touch with agency, and secondly still takes 
advantage of the beneficial results of indi-
vidualistic and within-level analysis. Also, 
some cognisance of the reductive contribu-
tions in psychology should enable correl-
ation with physiological-level phenomena 
that prevents the physiological facts from 
being contradicted. However, given the ex-
tended time-frame that research following 
a downwardly determinative outlook would 
require, it is quite possible that the bottom-
up contributions from physiology would pale 
into insignificance in the light of the non-
personal ideas that "flow down" from 
higher levels of organisation at the politi-
cal, sociological or macro-economic levels. 
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